THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE FOR RUSSIA: A POWER TOOL WITH STRATEGIC, LEGAL, AND SYMBOLIC VALUE by Emmerich, Jan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-06
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE
FOR RUSSIA: A POWER TOOL WITH
STRATEGIC, LEGAL, AND SYMBOLIC VALUE
Emmerich, Jan
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65510
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE  
FOR RUSSIA: A POWER TOOL WITH STRATEGIC, 




Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin 
Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 June 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE FOR RUSSIA: A POWER 
TOOL WITH STRATEGIC, LEGAL, AND SYMBOLIC VALUE 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Jan Emmerich 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 Many observers have concentrated on the territorial consequences of Crimea’s annexation in 2014. The 
Kerch Strait incident in November 2018 made salient the existence of a maritime dimension to this conflict. 
In addition, it brought into focus the longest bridge in Europe, linking Crimea to the Russian mainland. 
 This thesis analyzes the benefit of the Crimean Bridge for Russia in three domains. First, the bridge 
permits Russia to further secure its strategic hold on Crimea and to exert continuous economic and political 
pressure on Ukraine. Second, the Crimean Bridge illustrates how Russia conceives of international law and 
international treaties. Furthermore, it supports Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine’s maritime integrity. Third, 
this imposing structure symbolizes the resurrection of Russian greatness, and at the same time, it is a 
monument for the man who made that possible, Vladimir Putin. 
 As this research shows, the laissez-faire response of the international community has allowed Russia to 
regain strength militarily and politically, and as a nation per se, even beyond the wider Black Sea area. The 
international community must be wary of Russia—or any other nation—that begins to build infrastructure to 
assert its geostrategic interests. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Crimean Bridge, Russia, Azov Sea, Ukraine, Crimea, Putin, maritime strategy, UNCLOS, 
Law of the Sea, humiliation, great power, building, resurrection, pride, Arctic 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 127 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE FOR RUSSIA: A POWER 
TOOL WITH STRATEGIC, LEGAL, AND SYMBOLIC VALUE 
Jan Emmerich 
Commander, German Navy 
Ingénieur diplômé de l'École Navale, École Navale, France, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(EUROPE AND EURASIA) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2020 
Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin 
 Advisor 
 Donald Abenheim 
 Co-Advisor 
 Afshon P. Ostovar 
 Associate Chair for Research 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Many observers have concentrated on the territorial consequences of Crimea’s 
annexation in 2014. The Kerch Strait incident in November 2018 made salient the 
existence of a maritime dimension to this conflict. In addition, it brought into focus the 
longest bridge in Europe, linking Crimea to the Russian mainland. 
 This thesis analyzes the benefit of the Crimean Bridge for Russia in three 
domains. First, the bridge permits Russia to further secure its strategic hold on Crimea 
and to exert continuous economic and political pressure on Ukraine. Second, the Crimean 
Bridge illustrates how Russia conceives of international law and international treaties. 
Furthermore, it supports Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine’s maritime integrity. Third, this 
imposing structure symbolizes the resurrection of Russian greatness, and at the same 
time, it is a monument for the man who made that possible, Vladimir Putin. 
 As this research shows, the laissez-faire response of the international community 
has allowed Russia to regain strength militarily and politically, and as a nation per se, 
even beyond the wider Black Sea area. The international community must be wary of 
Russia—or any other nation—that begins to build infrastructure to assert its geostrategic 
interests. 
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In 2014, Russia1 announced a major infrastructure project linking Crimea to the 
Russian mainland: the Crimean Bridge.2 A Russian construction firm built this bridge in 
the Kerch Strait (see Figure 1) from 2015 to 2018; it consists of a road and a rail part, 
inaugurated, respectively, in 2018 and in 2019. Experts estimate the cost of its construction 
to be $3.7 billion. The political cost, however, has to be measured on a different scale. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Kerch Strait and Crimean Bridge.3 
Like most bridges, the Crimean Bridge connects two sides of a body of water. One 
particularity of this bridge, however, is its channeling and blocking effect of the Kerch 
Strait. With this bridge and its unique feature, Russia consequently created another means 
 
1 To ease readability the Russian Federation is referred to as Russia throughout this document. 
2 In a survey organized by the Ministry of Transport of Russia to select a name for this structure, 
Crimean Bridge received the majority of votes and became its official name. Kerch Bridge and 
Reunification Bridge were the second and third choices, respectively, and are still used by some authors, as 
is the name Kerch Strait Bridge. 
3 Adapted from Eugene Chausovsky, “Ukraine and Russia Take Their Conflict to the Sea,” Stratfor, 
September 24, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ukraine-and-russia-take-their-conflict-sea. 
2 
of asserting its supremacy in the area, and Ukraine is the main victim. In this thesis, I first 
investigate how the Crimean Bridge supports Russia’s politics in the Sea of Azov and 
beyond. The analysis begins by considering the strategic advantages of the bridge because 
Russia has adjusted its maritime strategy in the aftermath of the invasion of Crimea, and 
both the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have become a focus of this revised strategy. My 
aim is to show that the construction of the bridge fits into the category of ambiguous means 
of war, as summarized under the term hybrid warfare. 
In a second step, I analyze the legal impact of the bridge. The rationale for this step 
is that the construction of the Crimean Bridge was only possible after Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, which almost all of the international community rejects as unlawful. Although 
the bridge itself neither alters nor establishes maritime borders, its presence provides 
tangible evidence of Russia’s interpretation of international treaties and international law, 
in particular maritime law. 
Finally, I examine the symbolic value that the bridge has for Russia, its population, 
and its president Vladimir Putin, for 
like individuals, business corporations, or other social organizations, 
society as a whole, in relation to politics and the state, has a need for 
structural self-expression. The necessity of state self-portrayal lies 
particularly in the abstractness of the phenomena “state,” “politics,” and 
“society,” which only become tangible and perceptible through the external 
representation.4 
In the light of Russia’s ambitions not only to become a great power again, but above all to 
be perceived as such, the construction of Europe’s longest bridge is an important means of 
underlining the achievements of the Russian state and its leader, both domestically and 
externally. 
In short, the Crimean Bridge is more than a magnificent structure across the Kerch 
Strait. It is a power tool of the Russian state to assert its regained strength both to the 
international community and to its own people. 
 
4 Johanna Tiedtke-Braschos, Bauen als Politikum: Der Umgang der Politik mit Bauprojekten im 
Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts [Building as a political matter: How politics deals with building projects 
in 20th century Germany] (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2015), 41. 
3 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the “soft underbelly of Russia”5 has 
again come into the world’s view. Russia’s land course of action, the alleged exemplary 
illustration of the concept of so-called hybrid warfare, has been the focus of numerous 
scholarly analyses in addition to political debates on Russia’s belligerence and the 
necessity to rethink European security. The maritime dimension, i.e., the Sea of Azov and 
its surroundings, began to emerge in the discussion with the beginning of the construction 
of the Crimean Bridge in 2015. Real attention to this dimension only arose when Russia 
seized three Ukrainian military ships in November 2018. 
For centuries, the Black Sea has been a meeting place between Europe and Asia: 
for commerce, for cultures, and for the littoral powers with their armed forces. Particularly, 
the Sea of Azov has long been of economic and therefore of military importance to all the 
powers that ruled its shores. Peter the Great was the first Russian ruler to seek access to 
warm waters, before he focused more on the Baltic Sea. Since the reign of Catherine the 
Great, her conquest of the Northern Black Sea area, and her annexation of Crimea, the 
Black and the Azov Seas have become of vital importance for Russia. The Russian empire 
and the Soviet Union fought wars for the domination of the region in every century since 
the first Russo-Turkish war (1686–1700). During the Cold War, when all littoral states of 
the Black Sea except for Turkey belonged to the Eastern Bloc, one could say the region 
went into hibernation, and the West did not attribute high strategic value to it. With the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and the increasing demand and supply of oil and gas from 
Central Asia, the Black Sea steadily attracted more attention. 
Today, the Black Sea and its appendix the Sea of Azov can no longer be seen as 
distinct geographic areas. At least since the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, it has become 
quite common to speak of the wider Black Sea area. Since then, strategic analyses tend to 
include not only the Mediterranean Sea but also the Caspian Sea into the considerations of 
 
5 The term is borrowed from Ivan Kurilla, Southern Russia: The Heartland or Russia’s Soft 
Underbelly?, PONARS Policy Memos, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (Volgograd: 
Volgograd State University, April 2000), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/southern-russia-heartland-
or-russias-soft-underbelly. 
4 
the Black Sea. Depending on the respective author’s intention, the scope is widened even 
beyond the Caucasus region to include the Central Asian states east of the Caspian Sea. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and individual 
states (among them the United States) have strategic and economic interests in that area. 
Last but not least, it was Ukraine’s very close rapprochement with the EU—a red line for 
Russia—which led Russia to take action in Crimea in order not to lose the peninsula to the 
West. 
NATO, the EU, and the West in general stand for democracy, individual (and state) 
liberty, and the rule of law, of which one consequence is free trade. With its action in 
Crimea, not only did Russia breach the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but it also affected 
maritime traffic to Ukraine and jeopardized Western interests in the region. After 
integrating Crimea as one of its federal subjects,6 Russia now controls most of the coastline 
of the Sea of Azov and, more importantly, the Kerch Strait. By building the Crimean 
Bridge, Russia solidified this control; moreover, it has imposed regulations to control 
access to the Sea of Azov. 
At first glance, there was no obvious military necessity for Russia to spend billions 
of dollars for the construction of the Crimean Bridge because Russia’s sheer naval 
superiority would have been sufficient to deny access to the Sea of Azov to unwelcome 
vessels. Moreover, the Kerch Strait ferry line had been greatly enhanced allowing for more 
 
6 From the Ukrainian (and the international) point of view, Crimea still belongs to Ukraine and is thus 
occupied by Russia. According to the Russian and Crimean narrative, Crimea declared its independence on 
March 17, 2014, and became the Republic of Crimea. It then acceded to the Russian Federation, which 
established two federal subjects out of it: the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol, see 
The President of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the 
Russian Federation Signed,” President of Russia, March 18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/20604. 
5 
than twice as many passengers, cars, and trucks.7 In the light of Russia’s alleged hybrid 
warfare or gray zone conflict against Ukraine, as some scholars currently describe Russia’s 
hegemonic behavior, building strategic infrastructure such as the Crimean Bridge is a new 
step. Interestingly, if not surprisingly, apart from Ukraine no other country or organization 
protested against the construction project. On the other hand, Russia’s newly imposed 
navigation rules following the bridge’s completion have provoked harsh criticism by the 
international community.8 
Admittedly, with two important ports on the shore of the Sea of Azov, Berdyansk 
and Mariupol, Ukraine is most concerned by the bridge’s resulting obstruction of the Kerch 
Strait; Mariupol is Ukraine’s major export harbor for its heavy industry in Eastern Ukraine. 
Yet, since 2014, NATO and the United States have considerably supported Ukraine in 
rebuilding its navy and in formulating a naval strategy.9 Consequently, Russia’s imposed 
 
7 “10 yanvarya v portu Kavkaz Ministr Transporta RF Maksim Sokolov provel soveshchaniye po 
rabote Kerchenskoy paromnoy perepravy 10 января в порту Кавказ Министр транспорта РФ Максим 
Соколов провел совещание по работе Керченской паромной переправы” [On January 10 in Port 
Kavkaz, Minister of Transportation of the Russian Federation Maxim Sokolov held a meeting concerning 
operations of the Kerch ferry terminal], trans. Jevgenij Vidiajev, ANO ‘Yedinaya Transportnaya 
Direktsiya’ АНО ‘Единая Транспортная Дирекция’ [ANO ‘Unified Transport Directorate’], last 
modified January 12, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150112102031/http://transdir.ru/news/10-
января-в-порту-кавказ-министр-транспо/; “Na Kerchenskoy pereprave ne budut izmeryat’ avtomobili На 
Керченской переправе не будут измерять автомобили” [Cars Will not be Measured at the Kerch 
Crossing, trans. Jevgenij Vidiajev, RIA Novosti Krym РИА Новости Крым [RIA Novosti Crimea], 
January 19, 2016, https://crimea.ria.ru/society/20160119/1102733884.html; “Passazhiropotok na 
Kerchenskoy pereprave v 2016 Godu Vyros Na 31% Пассажиропоток на Керченской переправе в 2016 
году вырос на 31%” [Passenger Traffic at the Kerch Ferry in 2016 Increased by 31%], trans. Jevgenij 
Vidiajev, Interfax, January 11, 2017, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/544906; “Kerchenskaya paromnaya 
pereprava snizila ob”yemy perevozok v 2017 Goda Керченская паромная переправа снизила объемы 
перевозок в 2017 года” [The Kerch Ferry Service Reduced the Volume of Transportation in 2017], trans. 
Jevgenij Vidiajev, Interfax-Rossiya Интерфакс-Россия [Interfax-Russia], January 18, 2018, 
https://www.interfax-russia.ru/south-and-north-caucasus/main/kerchenskaya-paromnaya-pereprava-snizila-
obemy-perevozok-v-2017-goda. 
8 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 73/194, Problem of the Militarization of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as Well as Parts Of the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Azov, A/RES/73/194” (2018), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/194; European Parliament, 
“Resolution 2870, Situation in the Sea of Azov, 2018/2870(RSP)” (2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0435_EN.pdf; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Resolution 
2259, The Escalation of Tensions Around the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and Threats to European 
Security” (2019), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25419. 
9 For example, the Navy Headquarters of Ukraine and the U.S. Defense Governance and Management 
Team conducted a Strategic Appraisal Seminar in the framework of the Ukraine’s Navy Strategy 2035 
project, in 2018. For a summary of this seminar, see Hanna Shelest, ed., Naval Forces of Ukraine: Strategic 
Appraisal (Navy Headquarters of Ukraine and the U.S. Defense Governance and Management Team, 
2018). 
6 
regime on waters internationally recognized as Ukrainian is therefore hardly acceptable. 
As the West and especially the United States engage in Freedom-of-Navigation operations 
in other parts of the world to allow unimpeded traffic (e.g., in the South China Sea, Strait 
of Hormuz), it is important to understand the implications of Russia’s infrastructure 
project. 
Another reason to focus on the Sea of Azov and its surrounding area is its particular 
legal status. De jure, it still is a shared internal water of both Ukraine and Russia—a rare 
status in international law—but it has de facto become an internal water of Russia alone. 
Enforcing its control over the Sea of Azov might be a test on how to impose new rules to 
other Russian littoral waters, for instance in the Arctic.10 
In the great power competition of the twenty-first century, it is essential to be aware 
of the motivations of each of these powers. Among other things, respect for and fair 
treatment of great nations has become important in our time. That said, an understanding 
of Russia’s perception of the world and of its self-image can help overcome the current 
tensions or at least prevent further escalation, which is not in the interest of the West. In 
fact, Russia looks back at a long history, out of which it justifiably draws national pride. 
From Russia’s perspective, this pride has been violated on numerous occasions over the 
last three decades. Understanding the extent to which the Crimean Bridge heals these 
wounds can help to classify future Russian projects with predominantly symbolic value. 
 
10 The legal regime of the Arctic waters is far beyond the scope of this work. For a deeper 
understanding of the Soviet position, which has been adopted to a large extent by Russia, see S. M. 
Olenicoff, Territorial Waters in the Arctic: The Soviet Position (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
July 1972), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R0907.html; A. L. Kolodkin, “The Legal Regime of the 
Soviet Arctic,” ed. M. E. Volosov, Marine Policy: The International Journal of Ocean Affairs 14, no. 2 
(March 1990): 158–68; for current analyses, refer to: Willy R. Østreng and Douglas Brubaker, “The 
Northern Sea Route Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?,” Ocean Development & International 
Law 30, no. 4 (1999): 299–331, https://doi.org/10.1080/009083299276131; R. Douglas Brubaker, Russian 
Arctic Straits (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2004), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=280825; Christopher Rossi, “Russian Arctic Straits and the Temptation of Uti 
Possidetis,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 24, no. 1 (2014): 19–68; Marcus Matthias 
Keupp, ed., The Northern Sea Route: A Comprehensive Analysis (Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 2015). 
7 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Russia’s course of action in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and recently in the Sea of 
Azov has been analyzed by scholars through different lenses. This literature review 
discusses four of them. The first is the pure strategic aspect and military advantage rooted 
in the historic importance of the region. In terms of international relations, Russia appears 
to follow a realist approach, seeking power maximization through expansion and ignoring 
or rejecting any international regimes and institutions. Second, and more focused, Russia’s 
conduct is seen as a new form of politico-military behavior, avoiding open conflict but 
going beyond classical statecraft, described with the terms hybrid warfare or gray zone 
conflict. Third, legal scholars examine the implications of Russia’s annexation on 
international law. Relevant for my research is only the international law governing the 
maritime sphere. Finally, scholars have sought explanations by referring to the ideologies 
of irredentism and revanchism. Concomitant with those ideologies are allusions to the 
stricken Russian soul and the Russian feeling of humiliation. Moreover, one may find 
authors who see Putin and his personal feelings as the engine of Russian politics.11 
1. Strategic Relevance of the Sea of Azov in History and Today 
Historians have produced a comprehensive body of literature on the conflicts 
around Crimea and the Sea of Azov, which reinforces the significance of the area. Brian 
Boeck describes the city of Azov at the northeastern edge of the Sea of Azov as the 
northernmost outpost of the Ottoman Empire, a regional trade center with the Cossacks 
and former part of the Silk Route.12 Although Boeck shows the embellishment of his 
source, the Poetical Tale of the Siege of Azov, his work emphasizes that the Ottoman siege of 
the city in 1641 was mainly conducted across the sea. Roger Anderson and Brian Davies 
conclude that Tsar Peter the Great was only successful in his second attack on the city of 
Azov in 1696 because he then had a fleet that first broke the city’s supply lines by defeating 
 
11 Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008); Mark Galeotti, We 
Need to Talk about Putin: How the West Gets Him Wrong (London: Ebury Press, 2019). 
12 Brian J. Boeck, “The Siege of Azov in 1641: Military Realities and Literary Myth,” in Warfare in 
Eastern Europe, 1500–1800, ed. Brian J. Davies (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2012), 173. 
8 
the Ottoman fleet and later supported the city’s bombardment from the sea.13 
Subsequently, the tsar built his Black Sea Fleet in Taganrog, a port in the Sea of Azov, 
which became the military base of the first Imperial Russian Navy.14 Nevertheless, this 
fleet was not yet of great use for him because he did not control the strategically important 
Kerch Strait at this time. 
Alan Palmer and R. L. V. ffrench Blake describe the British and French naval 
campaign in the Sea of Azov in 1855 as part of the Crimean War (1853–1856), supported 
by reports of an imperial Austrian administration.15 To destroy the Russian supply lines, 
the allied forces first launched an attack against the batteries at Kerch, then stationed in the 
Sea of Azov and attacked all Russian cities and depots except for Azov and Taganrog. 
In his memoirs, Albert Speer gives an account of the importance that a crossing of 
the Kerch Strait had for Hitler and the Wehrmacht.16 In spring 1943, Speer himself got an 
order to supervise the construction of a bridge. The Wehrmacht had controlled Crimea 
since July 1942, and in 1943, it held a bridgehead in Kuban. Therefore, the Organisation 
Todt17 had already built a cable railway across the strait. Due to a lack of personnel, the 
building process was hampered, and when retreating from the Red Army, the Germans 
blasted what they had built until then. 
 
13 Roger C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant: 1559–1853 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1952), 237–39; Brian L. Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 186. 
14 Anderson, chap. VII. 
15 Alan Palmer, The Banner of Battle: The Story of the Crimean War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1987), 194–95; R. L. V. Ffrench Blake, The Crimean War, 1st Sphere Books ed., Concise Campaigns 
(London: Sphere Books, 1973), 124–25; K. K. Hydrographisches Amt, Marine Bibliothek, ed., 
Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete des Seewesens [Notices from the Maritime Domain], my own translation, 
vol. XVI (Vienna: Pola, 1888), 181, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=nyp.33433090778899&view=2up&seq=6. 
16 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 270. 
17 The Organisation Todt was a paramilitary engineering organization under the Reich Ministry of 
Armaments and War Production. It mainly used forced labor and was responsible for numerous 
construction projects, inter alia several concentration camps. 
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To assess Russia’s strategic intentions, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation18 offers valuable insights. The Sea of Azov is treated as part of the Atlantic 
Priority Area, where the focus centers on countering NATO. The aim in the Black and 
Azov Seas “is the accelerated modernization and comprehensive reinforcement of the 
strategic positions of the Russian Federation, while maintaining peace and stability in the 
region.”19 The execution of this strategy is to be carried out by mostly civil measures. In 
the military field, the document lists development of force structure and fleet 
modernization (including improvement of shipyards), enhancement of port infrastructure, 
and establishment of “conditions, incorporating regions’ capabilities, to position and use 
the components of the maritime potential, ensuring sovereignty, sovereign and 
international rights of the Russian Federation in the Black and Azov Seas.”20 No word is 
lost on the intended realization of the proclaimed strengthening of the strategic position. 
One would expect to find this echoed in the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030, but the Sea of Azov 
is only mentioned once, namely in the sphere of national security where the legal regime 
in the Sea of Azov shall be maintained.21 
Ridvan Urcosta underlines that only under Putin did contemporary Russia begin to 
reconsider its naval capabilities and issue strategic documents and doctrines.22 In his 
report, Urcosta addresses historic, strategic, economic, and legal relevance in and around 
 
18 The President of the Russian Federation, Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, trans. Anna 




19 The President of the Russian Federation, para. 56. 
20 The President of the Russian Federation, para. 57. 
21 The President of the Russian Federation, Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030, trans. Anna Davis (Moscow: The 




22 Ridvan Bari Urcosta, Russia’s Strategic Considerations on the Sea of Azov, Special Report 
(Warsaw: Warsaw Institute, December 3, 2018), https://warsawinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
Russias-Strategic-Considerations-on-the-Sea-of-Azov-Warsaw-Institute-Special-Report.pdf. 
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the Sea of Azov. The economic relevance derives from the fact that the Sea of Azov is the 
southern entrance to Russia’s widely ramified Unified Deep Water System of European 
Russia. These linked rivers and canals connect the White Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Caspian 
Sea, and the Black Sea (via the Sea of Azov) and thereby several of Russia’s industrial 
centers and important cities (see Figure 2). 
 
The White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal linking Onega Lake and the White Sea is missing here. 
Figure 2. Russian rivers and canals.23 
Grzegorz Kuczyński mentions the importance of the Sea of Azov in relation to 
Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, of which five units were allocated to the Sea of Azov in 2018.24 
He indicates Ukraine’s intention to develop Berdyansk into a naval base, which “would 
 
23 Source: “Don River,” Geography, accessed December 4, 2019, https://geography.name/don-river/. 
24 Grzegorz Kuczyński, Mare Nostrum Strategy: Russian Military Activity in the Black Sea, Special 
Report (Warsaw: Warsaw Institute, March 21, 2019), https://warsawinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
03/Mare-Nostrum-Strategy-Special-Report-Warsaw-Institute.pdf. 
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pose a strategic threat to the key maritime route for Russian warship [sic], a problem that 
could be solved by closing the Sea of Azov.”25 Konstantin Skorkin shares this opinion and 
further believes that Putin may seize Berdyansk preventively to ensure a land corridor to 
Crimea.26 
2. Hybrid Warfare or the Gray Zone 
Although the concepts variously called hybrid warfare or gray zone strategies are 
all contentious, authors use them to describe Russia’s conduct toward Ukraine. The 
maritime dimension of hybrid warfare is depicted by James Stavridis. Instead of “full-
blown, overt offensive action,”27 aggressors may use unmarked vessels ranging from skiffs 
with outboard engines to coastal steamers, the area of operation being littoral waters. Such 
tactics have not yet been employed by Russia. Admiral James Foggo III, commander of 
United States Naval Forces Europe – Naval Forces Africa, and a Russian naval analyst 
have postulated that the Sea of Azov is not comparable to the South China Sea and thus 
will not see maritime hybrid warfare.28 
Håkan Gunneriusson and Urcosta seem to be the only scholars who link Russia’s 
action in the Sea of Azov and the construction of the Crimean Bridge to hybrid warfare.29 
Gunneriusson draws parallels to China’s construction of artificial islands in the South 
China Sea. He observes, however, that neither Russia nor China “use the term ‘hybrid 
warfare’ as a doctrinal word.”30 Urcosta concludes that Ukraine is losing the hybrid 
warfare in the Sea of Azov and that the Crimean Bridge is a crucial factor for this loss. 
 
25 Kuczyński, 10. 
26 Konstantin Skorkin, “Putin’s Game Plan in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2019-02-07/putins-game-plan-ukraine. 
27 James Stavridis, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming,” Proceedings 142, no. 12 (December 
2016): 30–33. 
28 David Bodner and Matthew Larter, “The Sea of Azov Won’t Become the New South China Sea 
(and Russia Knows It),” Defense News, November 28, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/
2018/11/28/the-sea-of-azov-wont-become-the-new-south-china-sea-and-russia-knows-it/. 
29 Urcosta, Russia’s Strategic Considerations on the Sea of Azov; Håkan Gunneriusson, “Russia and 
China’s Ongoing ‘Hybrid Warfare’ - When Does It Cross the Line?,” Lima Charlie World, April 26, 2019, 
https://limacharlienews.com/national-security/russia-china-hybrid-warfare/. 
30 Gunneriusson, “Russia and China’s Ongoing ‘Hybrid Warfare’ – When Does It Cross the Line?” 
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3. Legal Aspects 
Russia’s interpretation of international law has been widely discussed and even 
polemicized since 2014, mainly focusing on Russia’s action in Crimea. Roy Allison writes, 
“Russia cloaked its action in legal language.”31 Specifically, Russia has referred to 
protecting Russian citizens and acting upon invitation. A thorough analysis of Russia’s 
stance toward international law is provided by Christian Schaller.32 He finds that Russia 
has an instrumental understanding of international law and thus follows a two-pronged 
strategy.  
While firmly defending the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the 
role of the UN Security Council and opposing broad interpretations of the use of force, 
Russia is not meeting its claims in its own area of interest, more precisely in the near abroad 
formed by the other 14 former Soviet Republics. Schaller shows that Russia applies a 
double standard when it champions the rights of Russian citizens or even just ethnic 
Russians in that region, preventing any other actor from intermingling in allegedly 
domestic affairs. He asserts, “the state leadership in the Kremlin ... increasingly [uses] 
constitutional, historical, and cultural arguments to legitimize interference with the 
sovereignty of neighboring states.”33 
The maritime aspect of international law became salient to the world when the 
Russian coast guard intercepted three Ukrainian naval ships in November 2018 before they 
could enter the Kerch Strait. In 2016, Ukraine, however, had already filed a lawsuit against 
Russia to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, the Netherlands, in 
order to assert its claim to territorial waters. Since the proceeding is still ongoing, one 
should not neglect to delve into legal literature that deals with the struggle between Russia 
 
31 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” 
International Affairs 90, no. 6 (2014): 1258, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12170. 
32 Christian Schaller, “Völkerrechtliche Argumentationslinien in der russischen Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik. Russland, der Westen und das ’Nahe Ausland’ ” [Lines of Argument in International 
Law in Russian Foreign and Security Policy. Russia, the West, and the ‘Near Abroad’], my own translation, 
SWP Studie, no. 10 (June 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/
2018S10_slr.pdf. 
33 Schaller, 6. 
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and Ukraine over the waters around Crimea and the applicable set of rules. Admittedly, 
Russia may reject the court’s ruling, as did China and Taiwan in the South China Sea 
Arbitration in 2016.34 On the other hand, Russia’s constitution states the importance and 
the precedence of international law,35 and Russia’s Military and Maritime Doctrines 
emphasize in numerous articles that action shall be “in accordance with norms and rules of 
international law as well as international treaties.”36 In sum, it appears that Russia will 
accept international law if it suits the state, or at least when Russia’s critically important 
interests are not affected. When it comes to Crimea, by contrast, the Kremlin is dead set 
against accepting any international law role in the situation. 
Specialists on this subject are Valentin Schatz and Dmytro Koval. They concentrate 
on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)37 and explicitly 
exclude considerations of Russia and Ukraine being engaged in an international armed 
conflict. Nor do they take into account the sovereignty question of Crimea. The authors 
deduce that the right of innocent passage for third parties might be questioned if the Sea of 
Azov consists indeed of territorial and international waters.38 This is why the proceedings 
at the PCA have to be monitored. Only if the tribunal decides that Ukraine’s claims are 
justified will further international engagement in the area be covered by international law. 
 
34 The Philippines filed a lawsuit against China’s claims in the South China Sea, also known as the 
struggle over the “9-dash-line.” 
35 “Constitution of the Russian Federation,” Government of the Russian Federation, para. 15, accessed 
November 26, 2019, http://archive.government.ru/eng/gov/base/54.html. The changes President Putin 
wants introduced into the constitution include removing the clause about the precedence of international 
law; the public vote on the changes was to take place on April 22, 2020, but has been postponed because of 
the Corona virus pandemic. Yet, there is little doubt that once the vote takes place, the changes proposed by 
Putin will be approved. 
36 The President of the Russian Federation, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
(Moscow: The Kremlin, 2014), http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029; The President of the Russian Federation, 
Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 
37 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 1833 UNTS 397 (1982), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf. It is 
noteworthy that the United States, although adhering to the rules and accepting them as customary 
international law, has not ratified the convention. It is therefore unlikely that the United States will accuse 
Russia of failing to comply with the treaty. 
38 Valentin J. Schatz and Dmytro Koval, “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships 
through Kerch Strait: A Law of the Sea Perspective,” Ocean Development & International Law 50, no. 2–3 
(July 3, 2019): 281–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2019.1605677. 
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A different perspective is offered by James Kraska. He concludes that the Kerch 
Strait incident is part of an ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with Russia being 
the aggressor. Russia’s capture of the Ukrainian vessels would be lawful under the Law of 
Naval Warfare, “notwithstanding Russia’s unlawful invasion of Crimea in 2014 or 
subsequent unlawful treatment of the Ukrainian sailors as common criminals rather than 
prisoners of war.”39 This perspective is shared by Stephen Lewis who reasons similarly to 
Kraska and Schatz and infers that “the incident in the Kerch Strait may mark the end of the 
‘hybrid’ phase of warfare and a shift towards more conventional use of force against 
Ukrainian interests.”40 
4. Humiliation and Wounded Vanity 
In the context of political theory, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the Sea of Azov 
can also be seen as a neo-realist approach with expansive politics aimed at increasing 
relative power. Yet, scholars tend to apply a rather constructivist view and classify Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine, especially in Crimea and in the Sea of Azov, as irredentism.41 Andreas 
Umland postulates that Ukraine feared Russian irredentism already during its nuclear 
disarmament in the 1990s, which led to the security assurances in the Budapest 
Memorandum.42 
In contrast to Umland, Thomas Ambrosio underlines that Russia is not interested 
in further expansion. He rates the Crimean operation as “an opportunity to correct historical 
 
39 James Kraska, “The Kerch Strait Incident: Law of the Sea or Law of Naval Warfare?,” EJIL Talk, 
December 3, 2018, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-kerch-strait-incident-law-of-the-sea-or-law-of-naval-
warfare/. 
40 Stephen Lewis, “Russia’s Continued Aggression against Ukraine,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 1 
(January 2, 2019): 26, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1605012. 
41 In the present context, irredentism refers to the territories lost with the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union that are inhabited by ethnic Russians. Occasionally, reference is even made to the Russian Empire. 
The term has its origin in Italian (terre irredente: unredeemed lands). It originally described the nationalistic 
ideology in the 19th century to annex the territories inhabited by ethnic Italians that still were under 
Austrian rule to create a unified Italian state. 
42 Andreas Umland, “The Six Futures of Ukraine: Competing Scenarios for a European Pivot State,” 
Brown Journal of World Affairs XXIV, no. I (2017). 
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and contemporary injustices”43 but acknowledges that “the Putin government did a good 
job at tying its incorporation of the peninsula to Russian national identity.44 In line with 
Ambrosio, Allison argues that Putin only seized an unforeseen opportunity in Crimea to 
realize his irredentist goals.45 To prove his claim, Allison refers to Putin’s perspective on 
South Ossetia in 2008: “ ’When an aggressor comes into your territory, you need to punch 
him in the face.’ ”46 
President Putin himself contributed to the irredentism hypothesis. In his annexation 
speech in 2014, he stressed that Russia’s leitmotif had to be seen through a historical lens: 
“To understand the reason behind [the wish to reunite with Russia] it is enough to know 
the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other. 
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride.”47 Moreover, in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not 
the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.” Crimea’s transfer to 
Ukraine was an “outrageous historical injustice,” and concerning the border question, 
Russia “accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on such a complicated 
matter as the maritime boundary in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.”48 Putin justified 
the takeover of Crimea by saying: “Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very 
important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong 
and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian.”49  
 
43 Thomas Ambrosio, “The Rhetoric of Irredentism: The Russian Federation’s Perception 
Management Campaign and the Annexation of Crimea,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 3 (May 3, 
2016): 481, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1151653. 
44 Ambrosio, 482. 
45 Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” 
1285–86. 
46 Bridget Kendall, “Putin Defends Georgia Offensive,” BBC News, September 11, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7611482.stm. 





A different and nonetheless recurring aspect in scholarly writings is the humiliation 
motif. Sometimes it is not clear whether Russia as a nation is the victim or President Putin 
himself identifies with his country to an extent that he himself feels humiliated or at least 
disrespected. Ambrosio writes, “This sense of Russia as the victim of Western (and, 
particularly, American) neo-imperial ambitions is not limited to Ukraine, but is part of a 
larger narrative which focuses on Russian grievances over the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the nature of the post-Cold War international system.”50 
Indeed, already in 2005, Putin claimed the collapse of the Soviet Union to be “a major 
geopolitical disaster of the century.”51 Kimberly Marten explicates that Putin’s initial 
attempts to reestablish Russia among the world’s leading nations in the early 2000s were 
ignored, so that “[his] outreach efforts soon cooled, largely because he felt disrespected.”52 
In contrast to the general wisdom that states and government act rationally, 
Dominique Moïsi adds three emotions as decisive in geopolitics: hope, fear, and 
humiliation.53 For him, Russia “possesses at the same time more than its share of fear, 
humiliation, and hope, all three emotions mixing in a powerful amalgam of feelings and 
impulses.54 Iulian Chifu, referring to Moïsi, explains that humiliation equals lost hope, 
whose lack is the fault of others: “the contrast between the idealized and glorious past and 
the frustrating present is so startling that humiliation prevails.”55 
Allison supposes that Putin and other Russian leaders were afraid of losing Ukraine 
to the West and to NATO in 2013/14.56 That would have meant another blow after the 
 
50 Ambrosio, “The Rhetoric of Irredentism,” 480. 
51 Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin Gave His Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of 
Russia, April 25, 2005, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/33220. 
52 Kimberly Marten, “Putin’s Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in 
Ukraine,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 189–204, https://doi.org/10.1080/
0163660X.2015.1064717. 
53 Dominique Moïsi, The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are 
Reshaping the World, 1st Anchor Books ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2010). 
54 Moïsi, 123–24. 
55 Iulian Chifu, “Religion and Conflict. Violence and Radicalization in the Wider Black Sea Area,” in 
Strategic Knowledge in the Wider Black Sea Area, ed. George Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov, 
Biblioteca RAO (Bucharest, Romania: Editura RAO, 2011), 212. 
56 Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules.” 
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eastward expansion of NATO in 2004, which Russia and Putin still see as a broken promise 
of the West.57 Having prevented Ukraine’s elusion to the West, the humiliation actually 
followed by another means: “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its 
immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness, the president [Obama] 
said.”58 
Mark Galeotti is convinced that “Putin has no ideological commitment to 
anything.”59 He assesses the Russian president to be an opportunist, albeit “a gut-level 
patriot who believes that Russia should be considered a great power ... because it’s 
Russia.”60 That said, Putin does not belong to any well-established category of 
international relations. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
From the literature review, I deduce three hypotheses to guide this thesis’ 
examination of Russia’s construction of the Crimean Bridge: a strategic approach, a legal 
approach, and a psychologic approach focusing on the symbolic value of the bridge. 
1. Strategic Advantages Imposed by Means of Hybrid Warfare 
Given Russia’s previous actions in the gray zone and its use of means of hybrid 
warfare, I propose that the construction of the Crimean Bridge can be seen as a form of 
hybrid warfare. Except for Gunneriusson and Urcosta, this hypothesis has received little 
attention in scholarly analyses and thus deserves further investigation. 
The Crimean Bridge is located at a bottleneck of strategic relevance between the 
Azov and the Black Seas, and this part of the ocean has had economic and thus strategic 
 
57 Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy,” President of Russia, February 10, 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. 
Russia still insists that it was promised that NATO would not expand further east in 1990. This point of 
view is controversial. Inter alia, former General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev denies such an agreement. 
58 Julian Borger, “Barack Obama: Russia Is a Regional Power Showing Weakness over Ukraine,” The 
Guardian, March 25, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/barack-
obama-russia-regional-power-ukraine-weakness. 
59 Galeotti, We Need to Talk About Putin, 76. 
60 Galeotti, 72. 
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and military relevance to the Russian empire, to the Soviet Union, and to the Russian 
Federation. With the channeling effect of the Crimean Bridge, Russia is able to control and 
eventually deny access to the Sea of Azov, even to Ukraine. Regardless of Ukraine’s future 
intentions to join the EU or NATO and of the probability to realize them, it is assumed that 
Russia does not want to worry about any foreign ships approaching its coastline around the 
Don mouth. Moreover, the exploitation of the natural (energy) resources in the Sea of Azov 
is easier for Russia when it does not have to consider any third party supporting Ukraine’s 
claim to territorial waters or an exclusive economic zone. 
Treating Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation and its population as Russian 
citizens, Russia can conveniently connect the peninsula to the mainland. Notably because 
Ukraine cut the supply lines to Crimea shortly after the annexation and because of the 
numerous Russian troops stationed there, the bridge appears to be only the last step in a 
series of measures to reestablish supply to Crimea. In sum, I intend to test the contention 
that the Crimean Bridge supports Russia’s strategy inasmuch as it converts the Sea of Azov 
into a Russian lake, which Russia can control with less effort. 
2. The Legal Precedent 
I suspect that Russia intends to create a precedent in the Sea of Azov concerning 
the UNCLOS, which might lead to new customary international law. If Russia can 
successfully claim and defend a part of the sea without anyone hindering or interfering 
with Russia, it might be able to do so again. Russia may repeat such an approach, for 
instance in the Arctic Sea where it claims its northern Siberian coast to represent internal 
waters. A challenge for the international community may arise when other countries are 
tempted to follow the Russian example and claim parts of the sea as their territorial or even 
internal waters. Apart from legal settlements before courts (the verdict, competence, or 
status of which might not be recognized by the affected states, however) Freedom-of-
Navigation operations would be the sole remaining option and responsibility for the 
international community. Notwithstanding the pending lawsuit related to the dispute over 
the legal status of the Sea of Azov, the Crimean Bridge corroborates the legal hypothesis 
for its construction. In addition, the imposed navigational constraints have to be accepted 
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by international commerce already if it wants to continue trade with the harbors around the 
Sea of Azov. Altogether, I suggest that the Crimean Bridge supports possible future legal 
claims in disputed waters. 
3. The Symbolic Value of the Crimean Bridge 
I intend to prove that the Crimean Bridge makes amends for the perceived Russian 
humiliation. In the current literature on irredentism, the building of infrastructure seems to 
have received little attention. While the reunification with Russia has appealed to the hearts 
and minds of the majority of the Crimean populace and also boosted Putin’s popularity in 
all Russia, the symbolic value of linking two Russian regions (Crimea and Krasnodar) 
should not be underestimated. In light of Moïsi’s triad of humiliation, fear, and hope, the 
bridge can be seen as a symbol of hope and a cure for the stricken Russian soul. Following 
Galeotti’s portrait of Putin, it is reasonable to argue that Putin seized the opportunity to 
realize a project which has been thought about many times before. Although Putin would 
rather not be described as “peacocky,” the Crimean Bridge will almost certainly be 
associated with him, i.e., remain as his memorial. Overall, I argue that the Crimean Bridge 
supports Russia’s ambition to be recognized once again as a nation no one can ignore, with 
a leader able to impose his will and to change the world. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to evaluate the different hypotheses, I adopt a threefold approach. First, I 
show the strategic advantages of the Crimean Bridge for Russia and at the same time assess 
both the political costs and those related to taxpayers’ money. I consider the increase in 
power for Russia both as regional hegemon and as a “Great Power” to be. The research is 
predominantly qualitative but also includes public data provided by Russia, Ukraine, and 
Crimea, and surveys such as those conducted by the Levada Center. 
The second hypothesis is examined by a broad consideration of international law 
applicable to the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, both in peace and in war times. The 
documents consulted for this analysis are those that both Russia and Ukraine have 
presented to the PCA, by which they substantiate their claims. As the court is an 
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international court, all documents include an English translation. For the purposes of this 
thesis only, I assume that Crimea is part of Russia, although I am convinced that Russia’s 
annexation was a breach of international law. 
To support the third hypothesis aiming at the symbolic value of the Crimean Bridge, 
I study surveys on the populace’s satisfaction, both in Crimea and mainland Russia, 
concerning the Crimean question. Moreover, I examine the personality cult around 
Vladimir Putin to work out whether his alleged lack of vanity may be disproven and that 
the bridge construction project does indeed take on the character of a self-dedicated 
monument. I support my reasoning with and apply the findings of political scientist 
Johanna Tiedtke-Braschos, who argues that building is part of the political process. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of four more chapters. In Chapters II through IV, I deal with the 
three hypotheses, respectively: strategic advantage, legal precedent, and symbolic value. 
Chapter V summarizes my findings and discusses the political implications of this thesis’ 
topic. 
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II. STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES IMPOSED BY MEANS 
OF HYBRID WARFARE 
This chapter examines the significance of the Crimean Bridge as a tool of hybrid 
warfare to improve Russia’s strategic position in the Sea of Azov inasmuch as it converts 
this adjacent sea into a “Russian lake,”61 which can be controlled with less effort. Russia’s 
interest in the Sea of Azov is manifold. First, it is the corridor between Russia’s internal 
waterways and the Black Sea, which allows further access to the world’s oceans, and 
therefore is of strategic importance for maritime trade. Second, the Sea of Azov is rich in 
natural resources, especially fish and natural gas. Last, Russia’s leaders are aware of the 
importance that the Sea of Azov has for Ukraine; indeed, Ukraine heavily depends on its 
ports there. Therefore, the control of the Sea of Azov is a bargaining chip for Russia vis-à-
vis Ukraine. 
Undoubtedly, Russia had to reestablish the supply lines for its new citizens in 
Crimea after Ukraine cut off those lines to the peninsula following its annexation by Russia. 
The construction of the bridge is thus the last step of this effort after Russia set up two 
high-power lines across the Kerch Strait in 2015 and laid a gas pipeline to Crimea in 2016. 
Yet, if supplying Crimea were the only reason to construct the bridge, Russia would have 
instead built a water pipeline to Crimea, or at least included one in the bridge, because the 
water shortage is one of Crimea’s most pressing problems.62 
This chapter highlights the advantages that the Crimean Bridge offers to Russia and 
shows that the gains outweigh both the financial and the political costs for Russia. Crimea 
is now a part of Russia and hence receives funds for sustenance and development. Further, 
Russia benefits from a land connection to Crimea, which eases the movement of troops and 
allows for two flanks, in case of a deteriorating situation with Ukraine. Second, Russia has 
created a reason for a significant build-up of security forces around the bridge, for this 
infrastructure has to be protected against both international and domestic terrorist attacks. 
 
61 The term Russian lake is no invention of mine. It can be found in a great number of publications, 
both in English and in French. In the past, the Black Sea sometimes was dubbed the Russian lake. 
62 I treated this subject in a different, non-published paper. 
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Third, Russia has closed the gap in its Black Sea coastline and ensured that NATO forces 
will never enter the Sea of Azov against its will. Fourth, Russia has secured an important 
sea line of communication for its trade. Finally, Russia is able to use all these factors as a 
means to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
In recent times, the terms hybrid warfare, Gerasimov Doctrine, or gray zone 
strategies have been used by both scholars and popular authors. To assess whether the 
construction of the Crimean Bridge fits in one or several of these concepts it is vital to have 
an understanding of their meaning. 
1. What is Hybrid Warfare? 
In the following, I use the definition of hybrid threat provided by Russel W. Glenn: 
“An adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of (1) 
political, military, economic, social, and information means, and (2) conventional, 
irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/criminal warfare methods. It may include 
a combination of state and non-state actors.”63 Nevertheless, hybrid warfare is a 
contentious term. 
The description of the concept goes back to 2005 when Lieutenant General James 
Mattis, in cooperation with Frank Hoffman, pointed out that an aggressor would not restrict 
himself to specific tactics but synthesize the warfare techniques that would most benefit 
his purpose.64 Two years later, Hoffman detailed the concept of hybrid warfare in such a 
way that he has since been associated with the definition of this term. He wrote, “The 
blurring of modes of war, the blurring of who fights, and what technologies are brought to 
bear, produces a wide range of variety and complexity that we call Hybrid Warfare.”65 
 
63 Russell W. Glenn, “Thoughts on ‘Hybrid’ Conflict,” Small Wars Journal (blog), March 2009, 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-hybrid-conflict. 
64 James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings 
131, no. 11 (November 2005): 18–19, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/future-
warfare-rise-hybrid-wars. 
65 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), 11. 
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Though Hoffman categorizes the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006 as the prototype of 
hybrid warfare, he concludes that hybrid warfare is not restricted to non-state actors. In his 
words: “Hybrid Wars can be waged by states or political groups, and incorporate a range 
of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.”66 Further, he emphasizes that hybrid warfare is not a substitute for conventional 
warfare but a new aspect of war that planners have to consider.67 
Voices can be found that completely reject this idea and argue that similar concepts 
have been used throughout history.68 Nadia Schadlow reminds us of Clausewitz and wants 
us to focus on the political objectives. She insists, “We must keep in mind that ‘hybrid’ 
refers to the means, not to the principles, goals, or nature of war.”69 Indeed, after Russia’s 
invasion of Crimea, hybrid warfare became a widely used idiom. Michael Kofman 
criticizes, “Hybrid warfare has become conversational short form in the West for 
describing Moscow’s sneaky ways of fighting war.”70 
James Stavridis has sketched the maritime dimension of hybrid warfare. He expects 
aggressors to use unmarked vessels ranging from skiffs with outboard engines to coastal 
steamers instead of “full-blown, overt offensive action”71 when operating in littoral waters. 
Until now, Russia has not used unmarked military units (“little blue men”) in the Sea of 
Azov. Instead, the Russian Coast Guard72 has increased its presence in the region. This 
agency also is responsible for the November 2018 incident in the Kerch Strait. 
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2. Gerasimov Doctrine 
The term Gerasimov Doctrine is of no use for this thesis. In 2018, Mark Galeotti, 
who had coined the term Gerasimov Doctrine four years earlier,73 begged the public’s 
pardon for creating it after it had been taken up by several scholarly and non-scholarly 
authors.74 He insisted that what originally was a speech of Russia’s Chief of the General 
Staff General Gerasimov was far from being a doctrine. Galeotti pointed out, “Gerasimov 
was ... talking about how the Kremlin understands what happened in the ‘Arab Spring’ 
uprisings, the ‘color revolutions’ against pro-Moscow regimes in Russia’s neighborhood, 
and in due course Ukraine’s ‘Maidan’ revolt.”75 Gerasimov reinforced the importance of 
nonmilitary means to realize political and strategic objectives and estimated them to be 
more effective than conventional force of weapons. Literally, he said, “The focus of applied 
methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, 
informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination 
with the protest potential of the population.”76 
Some scholars have interpreted Gerasimov’s thoughts as a new teaching, especially 
after it appeared to have been applied in Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine.77 Today, conventional wisdom is that Gerasimov aimed at preventing uprisings, 
like those he saw in the Arab Spring, in Russia. He called for a new strategy in a speech at 
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the Academy of Military Sciences three years later, “[confirming] the non-existence of a 
Russian hybrid doctrine, or approach to warfare per se,” as Roger McDermott writes.78 
Even more to the point, Nicole Ng and Eugene Rumer argue, “The military has never been 
the architect of Russian or even Soviet national security policy. It has always been its 
implementer.”79 
3. Gray Zone Strategy 
At the beginning of the 2010s,80 the term gray zone strategy appeared describing 
state action characterized by neither peaceful cooperation nor open aggression: action that 
“lies in the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.”81 
Hal Brands defines it as an 
activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately 
designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict ... 
and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are 
normally associated with victory in war. Yet gray zone approaches are 
meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without 
crossing established red-lines [sic], and thus without exposing the 
practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring.82 
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Both Hicks’s and Brands’s definitions are useful within this thesis because in all its steps, 
Russia has paid close attention not to overstep the brink of open conflict. 
Michael Mazarr adds “the notion of measured revisionism”83 and “strategic 
gradualism”84 to the gray zone strategy, and Antulio Echevarria highlights “What makes 
gray-zone wars ‘interesting’ is they occur under NATO’s Article 5 threshold, and below 
the level of violence necessary to prompt a UN Security Council Resolution.”85 These are 
two more aspects which help describe Russia’s behavior. 
Experts generally agree “that the space between war and peace is not an empty 
one”86 and that the perceived actions of Russia circumscribed by gray zone strategies must 
be met. Nevertheless, the term itself is as contentious as hybrid warfare among experts. 
Whereas the International Security Advisory Board and scholars, mostly from the CSIS 
International Security Program, have provided thorough analyses of the conflict potential 
and proposed counteractions for the United States,87 other experts doubt or reject the need 
of a new definition. Mazarr argues that the specifics of gray zone strategies have been part 
of warfare for centuries.88 Brands warns of exaggerating their ingenuity, though he 
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concedes the need to clarify whether an adversary truly benefits from employing them.89 
John Arquilla goes even further and discards the notion as “rather confusing than 
clarifying,” because “the aggressors see no gray zone ‘between war and peace.’ They see 
all as war.”90 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA OF AZOV 
As previously mentioned, both Russia and Ukraine depend on the access to the 
Black Sea through the Kerch Strait for both maritime trade and military movements. This 
section examines the economic and tactical significance of access to the Sea of Azov for 
the two countries. 
1. Russia 
Approximately a quarter of Russia’s dry cargo is turned over in the Azov-Don 
basin, and around nine percent of the total turnover is processed in the ports along the Azov 
coast.91 This results from the fact that Russia has cut its exports via the ports in the Baltic 
countries and Ukraine by more than half since 2011.92 Further, the port Azov stands out, 
for it is the gateway for the freight flows to inner Russia.93 
Grain exports play a particular role here because Russia’s recent increase in grain 
exports94 has brought its main deep-water ports on the Black Sea coast to their maximum 
 
89 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” 
90 John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” PRISM 7, no. 3 
(May 9, 2018): 126. 
91 “Throughput of Russian Seaports in 2019 Grew by 2.9% to 840.3 Million Tonnes of Cargo 
(Detalization),” Port News, January 14, 2020, http://en.portnews.ru/news/289783/. 
92 Ernst & Young, Obzor otrasli gruzoperevozok v Rossii Обзор отрасли грузоперевозок в России” 
[Overview of the Cargo Transportation Sector in Russia], trans. Google (Ernst & Young, 2019), 10, 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-transportation-services-2019-rus/$FILE/ey-
transportation-services-2019-rus.pdf. 
93 “Throughput of Port Azov in 2019 Fell by 20% to 10.38 Million Tonnes,” Port News, January 10, 
2020, http://en.portnews.ru/news/289602/. 
94 According to the United Nations COMTRADE database, cereals were Russia’s fourth-largest 
export good in 2018 after fossil fuels, non-specified commodities, and iron and steel. 
28 
capacity.95 Therefore, Anatoly Medetsky writes, grain is now loaded on smaller vessels in 
the ports of the Sea of Azov, which ferry them to larger ships remaining at anchor in or in 
front of the Kerch Strait (see Figure 3). The large bulk carriers are not able to enter the 
Azov ports themselves because the Sea of Azov, the world’s shallowest sea, has a 
maximum depth of fourteen meters. In sum, an unhindered passage through the Kerch 
Strait is essential for Russia to maintain a steady maritime trade. 
 
Figure 3. Grain transports in the Sea of Azov.96 
The Sea of Azov is linked to the Caspian Sea via the Volga-Don Canal, which has 
both economic and, more importantly, military significance. The Zelenodolsk Shipyard, an 
important provider of warships for both Russia and other countries, is located about forty 
kilometers west of Kazan in central Russia (see Figure 2). Furthermore, Russia uses the 
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canal to move units of its Caspian Fleet to other waters; it actually made use of boats from 
its Caspian Fleet to secure the Sea of Azov in 2018.97 Paul Goble concedes, “The Caspian 
Flotilla has not attracted significant Western attention up to now (Russia’s use of Caspian-
based ships to fire cruise missiles at targets in Syria over the last few years 
notwithstanding).”98 He nevertheless points out that the Caspian Flotilla has been 
comprehensively modernized in recent years and its landing capacity, in particular, has 
been improved. Theoretically, Russia may even order units of its 41st Missile Boat Brigade 
within its Baltic Fleets to the Sea of Azov through the internal waterways, but this appears 
unrealistic because that would only apply to small units because of depth restrictions in 
Russian rivers and canals. 
In addition, Russia and the Caucasian states have been considering building a 
second and enhanced connection, the Eurasia Canal, between the Caspian and the Azov 
Seas for more than a decade (see Figure 4).99 The Caspian littoral states have great interest 
in that project because the Volga-Don Canal no longer meets their transportation needs. 
The Eurasia Canal could accommodate twice as large ships and be navigable two 
more months a year—ice conditions would prevent all-year navigation as they do in the 
Volga-Don canal—resulting in a possible increase of cargo throughput by more than four 
times.100 Further, the new canal would reduce the travel distance between the two seas by 
about 350 kilometers and the travel time by more than a day because the Eurasia Canal 
would run through more level terrain and would only need six locks compared to the 
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thirteen locks in the Volga-Don Canal.101 This very costly project only makes sense if 
Russia can guarantee unrestricted access from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. 
 
Figure 4. Proposed Eurasia Canal.102 
As mentioned earlier, the Sea of Azov contains reserves of natural gas. The 
Crimean energy company Chernomorneftegaz (since 2014 under Russian control) 
estimates reserves of twenty billion cubic meters of natural gas, an amount that, however, 
corresponds to only ten percent by volume of Gazprom’s 2016 exports.103 Thus, these 
reserves are insignificant for Russia’s export. On the other hand, they contribute to 
Crimea’s self-sufficiency in terms of natural gas supply because the peninsula is a heavy 
gas consumer.104 Jason Corcoran cites an official of an exploration company, according to 
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whom the development of Crimea as a Russian energy hub might be advantageous for 
Russia both economically and politically. But investments are risky because of the unstable 
political situation. Even without further infrastructure, though, Russia has great interest in 
the exploitation of the fossil fuels in the Sea of Azov for two reasons. First, revenues from 
fuel exports make up more than half of its annual fiscal budget. Second, if Ukraine cannot 
profit from the extraction of natural gas in the Sea of Azov because Russia produces it, 
Ukraine will further weaken economically. 
This section has established the economic and military importance of the Sea of 
Azov and its surroundings for Russia. The de facto conversion of this body of water into a 
Russian lake has thus improved Russia’s strategic position. Russia no longer needs to 
negotiate its use and exploitation with Ukraine. Even so, it usually maintains the annual 
consultations on fishing quotas with Ukraine. Despite the conflict in the region, the 
countries have still reached agreements, most recently in November 2019.105 
2. Ukraine 
Ukraine’s interests in the Sea of Azov are of an economic and military-strategic 
nature. In the economic domain, most important is the free shipping to its ports of Mariupol 
and Berdyansk, the significance of which derives from their closeness to the industrial 
center of the Donbass. Although the ports in the Sea of Azov represent only twenty percent 
of Ukraine’s port capacity, coal, iron ore, steel, and grain mainly pass through the ports of 
Mariupol and Berdyansk. Grzegorz Kuczyński calls Mariupol “the gateway for Ukraine’s 
metallurgical production and a window to Donbas’s industrial world.”106 After five years 
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of declining throughput rates, Mariupol was able to stop this trend in 2019.107 Free 
navigation in the Sea of Azov is thus essential for Ukraine’s industry. 
Second, the Sea of Azov accounts for thirty to forty percent of Ukraine’s total 
marine catch and a fourth of the country’s capture production in both marine and inland 
waters.108 The agreements cited previously contribute to a sustainable exploitation. 
Despite heavy losses through Russia’s claims and exploitation of the exclusive economic 
zone around Crimea, the gas fields in the Sea of Azov only play a minor role. The number 
of fossil fuel reserves in the Sea of Azov, which was noted in the last section, merely 
represents 1.8 percent of Ukraine’s total reserves.109 Ukraine’s loss of the Azov gas fields 
after it cut the pipelines to Crimea in 2014 roughly equals the Crimean consumption, 
according to data of Ukraine’s national oil and gas company Naftogaz. 
Ukraine’s further interest in the Sea of Azov results from its intention to develop 
Berdyansk as a naval port.110 For after the annexation of Crimea, the state lost its main 
naval port Sevastopol. Still fearing that Russia contemplates a land bridge between Crimea 
and the Donbass region, Ukraine wants to ensure its sovereignty and prevent Russia from 
launching an amphibious attack against the coastline that lies between these Russian 
controlled regions. Ukraine started transferring vessels from Odessa to Berdyansk in 
September 2018. While the first three units made their way without interference, the second 
transfer of vessels led to the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018. The need for Ukraine 
to move military units freely between its naval bases is obvious. Yet, as the Kerch Strait 
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incident shows, Russia insists that Ukraine notifies its neighbor when it intends to move 
into and out of the Sea of Azov. 
C. EVALUATION OF COSTS 
Whether Russia had a legitimate need to build a bridge across the Kerch Strait is 
debatable, because both the related political and financial costs are very high. The last 
section and this one show what is at stake for Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, and 
the economic and military impacts on Ukraine have impeded a détente between the two 
countries. On the contrary, neither verbal protests by Ukraine and the international 
community nor further sanctions against Russian entities involved in the construction of 
the bridge have altered Russia’s conduct. 
Russia and international observers put the construction costs of the Crimean Bridge 
at $3.7 billion,111 which represents about 1.5 percent of Russia’s federal budget and about 
5.5 percent of its military budget. These costs do not include additional parts of 
infrastructure required to connect the bridge to the existing road and rail system. Cost 
estimates prior to the construction were $1.5–3 billion, depending on whether a tunnel or 
a bridge would be built across the Kerch Strait.112 It is hence important to note that the 
Kremlin canceled other infrastructure projects to free up funds for the Crimean Bridge. 
According to Russia’s economic development minister Alexei Ulyukayev, the cancellation 
of the Taman port and the bridge across the Lena River in the Yakutsk region made 
available $3.2 billion, in other words the entire projected costs.113 These numbers all 
appear to be enormous, but they have to be seen in relation to the overall costs which Russia 
contributes to Crimea’s sustenance and development. In fact, estimates assume that Crimea 
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needs about $2 billion of the Russian federal budget annually and that further investments 
in infrastructure amount to double-digit billions of dollars.114 
As mentioned in Chapter I, investments also flowed into the ferry line between 
Crimea and Krasnodar and more than doubled its capacity during the bridge’s construction 
process. Mikhail Blinkin, a transportation and road construction expert, says that with these 
investments Russian authorities “could have bought more ferries and docks abroad, 
brought them to the strait, and the transportation problem would have been solved for the 
next one hundred years.”115 Indeed, the bridge enables 40,000 cars and forty-seven trains 
a day to commute between Crimea and the Russian mainland.116 Compared to Crimea’s 
size (approximately the size of the state of Vermont) and a population of 2.3 million people, 
of which 400,000 live in Sevastopol at the opposite end of the peninsula, the dimension 
appears enormous. 
Undoubtedly, Russia needed to guarantee the essentials of daily life to the Crimean 
populace because it could not allow itself losing the esteem that a majority of the Crimeans 
expressed for Russia’s political and military move. For this, time not costs was the critical 
factor. The people’s immediate needs, however, were electricity and water, of which only 
the former was addressed.117 It remains questionable whether the supply lines for food, 
which could be ensured until the bridge was completed, actually need more than the ferry 
line. Nevertheless, the supply lines for its own troops seems to be a more profound reason 
for Russia to establish a connection between the peninsula and the Russian mainland than 
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the supply of the Crimean populace. While the latter may have been assured by ferry, it 
does not seem advantageous to rely on ferries for the logistics of armed forces. 
Finally, one can ask who profits from the huge investment Russia made in building 
the longest bridge in Europe. In fact, one of the owners of the Stroygazmontazh group, 
which was charged with the construction of the Crimean Bridge, is Arkady Rotenberg, a 
childhood friend of Putin’s from St. Petersburg.118 Emma Ashford has found that while 
the sanctions [after the annexation of Crimea] have punished the population 
at large, the Kremlin has sheltered key supporters from their impact. For 
example, from March to December 2014, companies linked to the Putin 
cronies Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko received 12 percent 
more in government contracts than they had during the entire previous 
year.... The sanctions are also having the perverse effect of enabling Putin 
to further consolidate his power, because he has rewarded his closest cronies 
at the expense of other elites. According to data from Forbes’ list of 
billionaires, Russia’s 15 richest citizens lost an average of 20 percent of 
their wealth in 2014, before regaining 12 percent in the next six months as 
the market stabilized.... On average, those billionaires who held stakes in 
sanctioned companies lost less than three percent of their wealth between 
January 2014 and June 2015, whereas those who did not lost nine percent. 
It requires no great leap of logic to see that the Kremlin has shielded those 
with connections to the ruling circle from the pain of the sanctions.119 
Why Rotenberg accepted the task of building the bridge is discussed in Chapter IV. 
Clearly, costs would have been a major argument against the Crimean Bridge, and 
a tunnel may have been even more expensive. Therefore, the next two sections look at the 
opportunities that have arisen with the construction of the bridge. 
D. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE 
Conventionally, a bridge is associated with connecting two elements, which 
remains true from a Russian perspective because two parts of its territory are no longer 
separated. From the Ukrainian perspective, however, the Crimean Bridge has a channeling 
and blocking effect on access to the Sea of Azov, which does not equally apply to Russia, 
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because Russia dominates the Kerch Strait and sets the rules. This is discussed further in 
Chapter III. Two features of the bridge are significant for the following analysis. First, the 
construction narrows the channel in the Kerch Strait so that vessels can only pass in one 
direction at a time. Second, the maximum height for vessels passing beneath the bridge is 
limited to 33 meters. This section investigates the effect of the bridge across the Kerch 
Strait for both Russia and Ukraine. 
It is important to remember that until the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine wanted to 
build a connection between Crimea and Krasnodar, too. At the project’s concretization in 
2014, the Russian newspaper Kommersant recalled the timeline of such former reflections. 
In 1993 and 2000, Russia and Ukraine thought about building a bridge together, but the 
idea was discarded both times for budgetary reasons without further agreements. The 
Crimean authorities considered building a tunnel to Kuban in 2004 but could not get their 
plan approved. In fall 2008, the Ukrainian government stopped further financing of the 
bridge construction project relaunched earlier that year because of the unresolved border 
in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait (see Chapter III). In view of the Winter Olympics 
in Sochi in 2014, former Ukrainian president Yanukovych suggested to his Russian 
colleague Medvedev to restart the crossing endeavor at the Kharkov summit in 2010.120 
On December 17, 2013, the Ukrainian and the Russian presidents, Yanukovych and Putin, 
agreed upon a joint feasibility study for the following year.121 With the events in Crimea 
starting in February 2014, Russia accelerated that process with a Prime Minister’s decree 
relative to the contractor on March 3, 2014,122 and the final decision on the project by 
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Putin two weeks later.123  Due to the occupation of Crimea, however, Ukraine was no 
longer able to influence the construction of whatever connection was undertaken. 
1. A New Regime in the Kerch Strait 
The narrow and shallow conditions in the Kerch Strait, specifically in the navigable 
channel known as Kerch–Yenikale Canal (KEC) (see Figure 5), require a special maritime 
regime for the vessels sailing through it. Russia’s ambassador to Ireland even used this fact 
to justify Russia’s harsh intervention in the Kerch Strait incident.124 In the past, Ukraine 
imposed the legislation and assured the traffic management in the Kerch Strait through the 
Kerch port authorities. In return, it collected the channel fees. Since 2015, Russia de facto 
has set the rules and collected the fees. 
 
Figure 5. Kerch-Yenikale Canal (KEC).125 
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Starting in 2017 with the mounting of the bridge’s arches, Russia reduced the 
allowed dimensions for vessels sailing through the KEC. Within one section of the canal, 
the traffic has become one-way only. Ships are since then limited to a length of 160 meters 
and a width of 31 meters; the allowed draft of 8 meters has been maintained. Yet, Panamax-
class vessels, having drafts of up to 14 meters and heights of up to 35 meters, had 
previously sailed to Mariupol and accounted for twenty percent of the traffic in the Sea of 
Azov; but they are no longer able to enter the Sea of Azov.126 In fact, Mariupol allows for 
berthing of ships with a length of 240 meters.127 While Russia asserts that the dimensions 
of the bridge take into account the usual maritime traffic, Ukraine argues that Russia has 
only considered the vessels sailing to Russian ports.128 
2. Consequences for the Maritime Traffic 
The Ukrainian government estimates the economic impact of the Crimean Bridge 
to be nearly $400 million due to the lower cargo throughput in the Azov ports since 
2014,129 but this number is hard to verify for several reasons. First, the Ukrainian 
government is biased and there are no alternative figures from independent institutions. 
Second, the port of Mariupol grew in 2019, although the external constraints imposed by 
Russia have not changed. Mariupol’s port authorities report on their website that this has 
mainly been achieved thanks to a large-scale dredging project and other investments.130 
The dredging alone has deepened the harbor site to allow for ships with one foot more 
draft, which equals to an average extra load of 1,200 tons. Third, shipping companies may 
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have decided not to berth in Azov ports anymore because of the unsettled political climate 
in the region. Last, the overall economic and political situation in Ukraine could also have 
contributed to the reduced throughput in Ukraine’s port. 
In truth, vessels heading to or coming from Ukrainian harbors have suffered from 
prohibitions and delays imposed by Russian authorities. First, the construction of the bridge 
necessitated daylong closures of the Kerch Strait for all maritime traffic in 2017.131 Of 
course, this also affected Russian ports. Nevertheless, while Russia was aware of the 
progress on the construction site and could therefore anticipate the closings, Ukraine only 
had the role of a spectator. (In the wake of the Kerch Strait incident, Russia temporarily 
interdicted access to the Sea of Azov to non-Russian traffic, thereby also targeting 
Ukraine’s economy.132) 
Second, Ukraine-bound ships had to wait significantly longer to be processed 
(inspected and piloted) by the Russian authorities.133 Krzysztof Nieczypor estimates costs 
for carriers “at US$ 5,000–15,000 daily, depending on the size of the ship and the duration 
of the inspection.”134 Third, in 2017, Ukrainian officials worried about the effects of ice 
piling up in the Kerch Strait in winter135 and causing the Sea of Azov to become 
inaccessible, which would be more harmful to Ukraine because Russia did not rely much 
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on its Azov harbors.136 As shown in the previous section, Russia also has a great interest 
in free navigation from and to the Sea of Azov. Thus, Russia would unquestionably try to 
limit the impact of ice. Nevertheless, Russia may favor ships to and from its ports when 
they need the assistance of an icebreaker. 
In sum, the erection of the Crimean Bridge maintains constant economic pressure 
on Ukraine and exacerbates the situation of the Ukrainian populace. The threshold for this 
pressure, however, is kept low enough so that the conflict does not evolve into open 
warfare. This approach fulfills the set criteria for hybrid warfare, even if this specific aspect 
could also be treated as basic economic warfare. The Crimean Bridge ameliorates Russia’s 
freedom of maneuver in the Sea of Azov. It is a means to exert influence in the long term, 
and it thus allows Russia to remain in the gray zone. 
E. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS—GRAY ZONE APPROACH 
One has to keep in mind that until now, Russia has not left the gray zone and has 
shown no ambition to further escalate the conflict with Ukraine. Certainly, the Crimean 
Bridge offers further military advantage for defending Crimea and for attacking Ukraine. 
The specific environmental conditions of the Sea of Azov would possibly allow for landing 
operations in wintertime when the Sea is frozen, without moving a great number of forces 
over the Crimean Bridge beforehand. If Russia wanted to block all maritime traffic with 
Ukrainian ports, it could also lay minefields in the Sea of Azov. On the other hand, such 
an operation is clearly an act of war, and without any doubt, it would have a serious impact 
on all maritime traffic in the Sea of Azov, i.e., including the Russian traffic. 
Urcosta gives a historic argument for Russia’s attempts at securing the Sea of Azov. 
In fact, the sea takes on greater significance, “When a powerful state annexes the Crimean 
Peninsula and uses it for its own strategic purposes. Here, the importance of the Sea of 
Azov is based on security flanks due to the fact that there is a serious danger of being 
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completely cut off from the mainland.”137 Russia’s success in applying this strategy 
became clear with the Kerch Strait incident; Ukraine was unable to enforce its claims and 
had to give up control over its territorial waters in addition to its vessels. 
Russia is able to use the Crimean Bridge as a justification for military 
reinforcements around it. Indeed, from a security perspective, the construction stands at a 
choke point and has to be defended against deliberate attacks from land, air, and sea. “The 
Crimean Bridge is classed as a first-category strategic asset—on a par with nuclear power 
plants or a Strategic Missile Troops command post. And it is protected accordingly,” 
reported a government-owned Russian newspaper.138 A Russian expert cited by Urcosta, 
“asserted that the Bridge is endangered by the following threats: terrorist attacks as well as 
foreign military forces (including from members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.”139 In his essay, Urcosta further details the measures that Russia has taken 
to prevent attacks on the bridge reaching from land troops to air defense systems to surface 
and underwater systems. Notwithstanding feasibility, Ukraine has threatened to destroy the 
bridge with a cruise missile, thereby giving Russia justification for its concerns.140 
By restricting the access to the Sea of Azov and virtually converting it into an 
internal water, Russia definitely prevents NATO ships from coming close to its water. With 
the Ukrainian naval base in Berdyansk and a tighter cooperation between NATO and 
Ukraine since 2014, Russia had to consider the possibility of an official visit of NATO 
warships to bolster Ukraine and show the NATO flag in close vicinity to Russia. Kuczyński 
summarizes that a “NATO-backed Ukrainian naval base in Berdyansk would pose a 
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strategic threat to the key maritime route for Russian warship, a problem that could be 
solved by closing the Sea of Azov.”141 
The idea of ensuring the security of the Crimean peninsula by controlling the Sea 
of Azov still leaves Russia the option of establishing a land bridge between Crimea and the 
Donbass. Closing the bottleneck in the Kerch Strait has become far easier with the concrete 
pillars of the bridge being in place, and the bridge’s defense systems reinforce that barrier. 
With the Sea of Azov then turned into an isolated lake, such an operation would almost 
become a domestic one. On the other hand, there is no evident reason for such a move and 
the success is just as questionable. Already in 2017, James Sherr argued that despite the 
superiority of the Russian Armed Forces, “Ukraine’s armed forces and National Guard 
units [had] acquired considerable proficiency and hard capability.142 
At the end of 2018, Michael Carpenter considered the North-Crimean Canal, 
Crimea’s former water supply as “Putin’s prime target in Ukraine in 2019” with the scope 
of a “ ’limited incursion north from Crimea into [the] Kherson oblast.’ ”143 The Crimean 
Bridge would have offered a considerable military advantage for such a plan. Nevertheless, 
Michael Kofman rejected that idea.144 He contended that such a military thrust would only 
make sense if the entire Kherson oblast was conquered and Russia seized the entire Canal, 
i.e., secured its beginning at the Dnieper. That would be similar to Russian operations in 
the Donbass region and would therefore necessitate a significant number of forces. Kofman 
reasoned Russia would not go that far, because “resolving the fresh water problem in 
Crimea by taking another region … would itself bring new supply challenges … [and] 
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would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment.”145 Even if 
Russia were able to build up these forces, it would still need the political will to do so. 
Alex Kokcharov also inferred that a major military operation was not probable in 
the short term. The likelihood would increase if Crimea’s water shortage deteriorated into 
a humanitarian crisis, he concluded. Then, Russia might consider that “the benefits of a 
quick military solution would outweigh the potential costs.”146 Both Kofman and 
Kokcharov analyzed very thoroughly the military option on the tactical level and explained 
that such a scenario would imply heavy losses on both sides, including civilian casualties. 
Moreover, there would not be any separatists to welcome Russian forces in such a scenario 
because ethnic Ukrainians represent the majority in Kherson oblast. A scenario like the one 
in Eastern Ukraine with pro-Russian mercenaries fighting together with regular forces 
would therefore not be possible. 
Consequently, the Crimean Bridge is rather the alternative to a land bridge along 
the shores of the Sea of Azov. Russia’s strategic goal was the re-integration of Crimea into 
its sphere of influence. Its advancement into Crimea and into the Donbass in 2014 did not 
provoke any military response from countries other than Ukraine. Had Russia wanted to 
secure the entire southeast of Ukraine and the coastline of the entire Sea of Azov, the 
chances were best at that time. But Russia is not looking for offensive action against its 
neighbors. Dave Johnson emphasizes, “Russia’s chief aims are to rebuild a security 
perimeter against perceived external threats (primarily the United States and its NATO 
allies), to reassert a leading role for itself on the world scene, and to disrupt the current 
global security architecture to force negotiation of a new settlement.”147 He further 
elaborates, “Russia’s first preoccupation is how to achieve its strategic objectives without 
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direct military conflict if possible.”148 Therefore, the Crimean Bridge can and should be 
seen as part of the Russian defense of its Black Sea coastline. It ensures the long-term 
access to the strategic bridgehead which is Crimea. The construction closes the gap 
between two Russian regions and keeps adversaries at distance. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The construction of the Crimean Bridge allows the Kremlin to reinforce its hold on 
Crimea and the Sea of Azov, a long-term strategic gain, which clearly justifies the 
investment. According to Russia’s rhetoric, it will not withdraw from Crimea any time 
soon. It allowed Crimea’s accession to the federation; it welcomed back its “lost son” and 
took measures to link the peninsula to the mainland. Yet, Russia does not make a move to 
exploit its additional opportunities on the tactical level. It remains in the gray zone and is 
not going for any escalation to open war. Instead, it is using an economic vise to influence 
Ukraine’s populace and hence Ukraine’s politics. Because of that and because Crimea is 
now part of Russia, investment in infrastructure such as the Crimean Bridge is an 
investment in the future of Russia’s south. As shown, the costs of the bridge represent only 
a fraction of all the money that flows from Russia to Crimea for its sustenance and 
development. Richard Lourie therefore has rightly concluded, 
Mr. Putin’s Crimean Bridge is a piece in a political game, one that both 
resembles chess as well as the bait-and-switch moves of three-card Monte. 
The bridge not only allows Mr. Putin to safeguard Crimea, it gives him a 
way to fuel a conflict with Ukraine in the Sea of Azov that in turn frees him 
up to play peace-maker in Donetsk. With the aim of getting sanctions lifted, 
Mr. Putin will thus go on something of a charm offensive but, make no 
mistake, it will be an offensive all the same.149 
In sum, the Crimean Bridge can be treated as a hybrid or gray-zone approach in the 
Kremlin’s plan to secure Crimea and the entire Russian Black Sea coast. But this is 
certainly not the only purpose for its construction. Consequently, the next chapter focuses 
on the legal impact of the Crimean Bridge. 
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III. CREATING PRECEDENTS FOR A NEW LEGAL ORDER 
This chapter examines the impact of the Crimean Bridge on Russia’s approach to 
international law, in particular maritime law. Since 2014, many voices have discussed 
Russia’s breach of international law by the Kremlin’s disregard for existing internationally 
recognized borders and Ukraine’s territorial integrity.150 The breach of the Budapest 
memorandum has received particular attention because this document reiterated the 
signatory states’ commitment to the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, fundamental 
documents for Europe’s security architecture.151 Despite Russia’s announcement of the 
construction of the Crimean Bridge in the course of the annexation of Crimea, it was the 
Kerch Strait incident in November 2018 that brought into focus the maritime implications 
of Russia’s new approach to international law. At that point, the bridge had already been 
open for six months, and the impact on maritime trade had been noticeable for just as long. 
Disputes over maritime borders are not new in international affairs, and they have 
often been brought before international courts, the rulings of which have not always been 
accepted by all concerned parties.152 Additionally, the basis for a legal process to find an 
agreement is the ratification of the UNCLOS, as the definition of how to settle disputes is 
contained in Part XV and Annex VII of the convention.153 Both Russia and Ukraine 
ratified the convention, the ratification being common but not self-evident. That is why 
Ukraine brought the dispute over the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov before the PCA in 
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September 2016. The trial is still ongoing; the outcome is open; and it remains doubtful 
that both sides will accept the judgment. Russia advanced preliminary objections to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, which the latter rejected except for two points: one relating to 
the sovereignty of Crimea, the other jeopardizing the court’s competence “concerning 
activities in the Sea of Azov and in the Kerch Strait ... [which] the tribunal decides to 
reserve ... for consideration and decision in the proceedings on the merits.”154 
Since a state’s maritime space and borders relate to its land mass, the situation in 
the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait must take into account the territorial status of Crimea. 
However one classifies Russia’s actions in Crimea, whether it is an annexation, an 
occupation, or the admittance of a new autonomous republic into the federation, Russia de 
facto controls the peninsula and imposes its sovereignty and its laws on the people, the 
land, and thus also the sea.155 Therefore, I consider the Russian stance in the analysis and 
assume that Crimea is a part of Russia. 
In the following sections, I lay out the different legal approaches to the situation in 
the Kerch Strait. What makes assessment difficult is the unique geographical position and 
the legal setting of the Sea of Azov and, consequently, the Kerch Strait. Furthermore, the 
Crimean Bridge is not a corporate project but an entirely Russian construction. Without 
these two characteristics, it could be compared to the Oresund Bridge between Sweden and 
Denmark. 
I proceed by recalling the status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait before 
2014. The second section deals with the consequences of Crimea becoming a part of 
Russia. In the third section, I analyze the impact of the Crimean Bridge, before considering 
options for third parties such as NATO or other states. There is no discussion of the legality 
or legitimacy of Russia’s actions in Crimea, which are both beyond the scope of this work. 
My finding is that the construction of the Crimean Bridge has altered the legal environment 
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to an extent that it would be challenging to return to the status quo ante if Russia decided 
to turn over Crimea to Ukraine, unless the bridge would be torn down. (Furthermore, it is 
not evident that Ukraine would favor such an action if its relationship with Russia 
improved.) Therefore, the bridge and the legal regime it brings about may one day be 
recognized as a given which can be understood as new customary international law, 
cementing and justifying the Russian course of action and offering the incentive to repeat 
it in the future. 
A. STATUS OF THE SEA OF AZOV FROM 1991 TO 2014 
Until the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), the Sea 
of Azov and the Kerch Strait were internal waters of the Soviet Union.156 When the Soviet 
Council of Ministers published a list of coordinates in 1985,157 defining the Soviet baseline 
in the Black Sea between Cape Kyz-Aul at the southeastern border of Crimea and Cape 
Zheleznyy Rog on the Taman peninsula (the pink line in Figure 6), protest of third states 
to this declaration was marginal and temporarily limited.158 This is important to notice for 
two reasons. First, in its current legal argument, Russia refers to historic evidence. Second, 
Russia sees itself as the successor state of the Soviet Union and is internationally 
recognized and undisputed as such. In the language of the UNCLOS, the Sea of Azov and 
the Kerch Strait formed a bay that belonged to one coastal state, the U.S.S.R.159 
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Figure 6. Kerch Strait.160 
When in 1991, Ukraine declared its independence and the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) also became a state of its own, the future legal 
status of the Sea of Azov arose for the first time. Ukraine demanded that both the Kerch 
Strait and the Sea of Azov “should be delimited according to Soviet administrative border 
between the Crimean oblast of the Ukrainian SSR and Krasnodar krai of the RSFSR.”161 
Consequently, Ukraine would control 60% of the Sea of Azov as well as the Kerch-
Yenikale-Canal (KEC, see Figure 5). Irina Nossova further states, “Russia, in turn, has 
repeatedly denied the existence of Soviet administrative borders and has insisted on 
drawing a modified median line that would be equidistant from both state coasts and would 
entitle both states with equal rights to the [KEC].”162 This is true despite other Russian 
declarations of the Sea of Azov as a common internal water (see discussion of the State 
Border Treaty below). Indeed, Russia argues, “Since the dissolution of the USSR, the Sea 
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of Azov is a bay with more than one coastal State. This does not, however, imply a change 
in the status of the waters of the Sea of Azov or the Kerch Strait.”163 In other words, Russia 
contends that the Soviet claims are still valid, even though the legal and political landscape 
has changed. 
According to the Law of the Sea and its conventional interpretation, bays can only 
be internal waters when they belong to a single state, with the exceptions of so-called 
historic bays.164 Nevertheless, as long as no other state contests such a unilateral assertion, 
it persists. 
In order to get its maritime claims recognized by the international community, 
Ukraine submitted a list of coordinates of its desired baseline to the UN in 1992.165 This 
declaration was in vain because it was not further distributed and only published in 
1998.166 The reason for this is that the UNCLOS was not yet in force at that time; although 
it was signed in 1982, not enough states had ratified it in 1992, including Ukraine and 
Russia. It finally became effective in November 1994. 
In 1993, Russia fixed its borders with the Boundary Act, with which “all 
administrative boundaries between the former Soviet Republics were granted ‘state’ 
status,” albeit without formally establishing them on paper or maps.167 More important, 
Russia rejected any of Ukraine’s attempts to establish a maritime border in the Sea of Azov. 
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Alexander Skaridov counts more than twenty rounds of border negotiations between the 
two countries from 1996 to 2014, the proposals of which he summarizes in one chart 
(Figure 7). He explains, “The Russian approach draws a median line, where all points are 
to be equally distant from opposite shores. The Ukrainian position basically connects the 
land boundary exit points and seems to based [sic] on the proportionality of the coastal 
area. The median line is a compromise line between the two approaches.”168 The lines 
depicted here only sketch the approximate area dominated by both states. They cannot be 
translated into borders marking the states’ respective territorial seas, contiguous zones, and 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ). 
 
Figure 7. Border negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.169 
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169 Source: Skaridov, 224. 
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In 1999, Ukraine unilaterally tried to impose a maritime border including Tuzla 
Island, thereby provoking Russia, which in turn started to build a dam between its 
Krasnodar region and Tuzla.170 Construction was stopped after Ukrainian protests, but the 
completed parts of the dam remained and were later integrated into the Crimean Bridge. 
Surprisingly, Ukraine altered its stance in January 2003 when it concluded a treaty 
with Russia on the Russian-Ukrainian state border (hereafter referred to as the State Border 
Treaty).171 Both parties agreed, “Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the positions of the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine with respect to the status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch 
Strait as internal waters of the two States.”172 The heads of state reinforced that status in 
December of the same year when they signed the Treaty on cooperation on the use of the 
Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait (hereafter referred to as the Cooperation Agreement).173 
Neither the State Border Treaty nor the Cooperation Agreement contained delimitations 
for the maritime space. 
In addition to the Cooperation Agreement, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, 
Putin and Kuchma, issued a Joint Statement the same day repeating the key points of the 
agreement.174 Interestingly, the statement and not the agreement itself was published by 
the competent UN agency. The following paragraphs of the treaty are of further importance 
for the analysis: 
• the Azov-Kerch area of water is preserved as an integral economic and 
natural complex used in the interests of both states; 
 
170 Skaridov, 222. 
171 “Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian State border,” UN 
Registration No. 54132, UN Treaty Series, no volume has yet been determined, accessed February 19, 
2020, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/54132/Part/I-54132-
08000002803fe18a.pdf. 
172 State Border Treaty, Article 5. See footnote 171. 
173 “Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov 
and the Kerch Strait,” accessed September 28, 2019, http://www.ecolex.org/server2neu.php/libcat/docs/
TRE/Full/Other/TRE-149547.doc. The official version exists in Ukrainian and Russian. For the purpose of 
the PCA proceeding, it was submitted to the court with an English translation. See “Preliminary Objections 
of the Russian Federation,” Vol. II, RU-20, accessed January 15, 2020, https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/ua-
ru/01.%20RU%20Preliminary%20Objections/01.%20Exhibits/RU-20.pdf. 
174 United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 
54” (New York: United Nations, 2004), 131, https://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/
LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin54e.pdf. 
52 
• historically the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch are inland waters of 
Ukraine and Russia, and settlement of matters relating to the said area of 
water is realized by agreement between the Ukraine and Russia in 
accordance with international law; ... 
• military ships under the flags of other states can enter the Sea of Azov 
and go through the Strait of Kerch only by an invitation of Ukraine or 
Russia agreed with the other state [sic].175 
Mitja Grbec elucidates the significance of the bilateral arrangement: 
The importance of the 2003 Joint Statement derives ... from the fact that ... 
the two States impliedly confirmed that there was not an automatic 
conversion of the ‘internal-historical waters’ within the Sea of Azov and the 
Strait of Kerch into ‘territorial seas,’ at the time of the dissolution of the 
former USSR. This may be implied particularly from paragraph 1. ... The 
latter wording seems to imply a condominium (joint sovereignty) of the two 
States over the ‘Azov Kerch area.’176 
With the word historically, the second bullet refers to the past and the wording 
raises the expectation that a delimitation will take place in the future. The aforementioned 
numerous meetings to find a consensus for the maritime delimitation justify that 
interpretation. 
The third bullet is particularly interesting for NATO units, since they need both 
Ukraine’s and Russia’s consent to enter the Sea of Azov. Even if Ukraine had asked for 
foreign aid in 2014 and if there had been the political will to support Ukraine with navy 
units, the legal status of the Sea of Azov defined in the Cooperation Treaty would have 
prevented any foreign government-flagged ship from entering this water. 
One would expect that an agreement with so far-reaching commitments and mutual 
interdependence would be abrogated immediately in times of major conflict. Yet, neither 
Ukraine nor Russia has revoked the Cooperation Agreement. In 2015, the Ukrainian 
parliament debated on the draft of a law denouncing the treaty but did not adopt it.177 
 
175 United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 131. 
176 Mitja Grbec, The Extension of Coastal State Jurisdiction in Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas: A 
Mediterranean and Adriatic Perspective (London: Routledge, 2013), 150, https://doi.org/10.4324/
9780203074725. Emphasis added. 
177 Schatz and Koval, “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships through Kerch 
Strait,” 279. 
53 
Overall, the status of the Sea of Azov is particular. Nevertheless, in their reasoning 
before the Arbitral Tribunal, both Russia and Ukraine refer to two similar cases of disputes 
over historic bays and common internal waters, which occurred when one state ceased to 
exist and more than one state took its place.178 But other cases in the past referred to known 
baselines, and this decisive element is lacking in the Sea of Azov case.179 
B. THE SEA OF AZOV AFTER THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 
As indicated earlier, the legal status of a part of the sea is inextricably linked with 
the adjacent territory. Without assessing the lawfulness of Russia’s appropriation of 
Crimea and the circumstances leading to it, it must be noticed that Russia exerts control 
over the Crimean territory, which translates into control of the waters around Crimea. 
Indeed, this issue is already addressed in the “Admission Treaty” with which the newly 
declared Republic of Crimea became a subject of the Russian Federation. In fact, Article 
4, Section 3 contends that Crimea’s maritime delimitation in the Black and Azov Seas will 
be drawn following “the norms and principles of international.”180 Furthermore, no state 
has yet objected the Cooperation Agreement that defined the Sea of Azov and the Kerch 
Strait as internal waters of both Russia and Ukraine, and the agreement has not been 
terminated by either side despite interstate war. 
Since reality is different from documented or announced intentions, the following 
sections outline that Russia uses its superiority to decide which legal rules apply in the 
contested waters and this even on a case-by-case basis. Nor is Ukraine consistent in its 
stance (see next section), which makes it difficult to assess whether a further cooperation 
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with either side is legally safe. Nothing in diplomatic terms could be worse for any third 
party than violating—even accidentally—a state border with a government-flagged vessel. 
1. Ukrainian Claims and Actions 
Ukraine continues to insist on a maritime demarcation at twelve nautical miles 
within the Sea of Azov. In the proceeding before the Arbitral Tribunal, it argues, “the Sea 
of Azov is a semi-enclosed sea [in accordance with UNCLOS Articles 122 and 123] 
comprised of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of Ukraine and Russia and 
the Kerch Strait is an international strait subject to the regime of transit passage.”181 To 
illustrate its claims, Ukraine provides the following graphic (Figure 8; for a wider view of 
the area see Figure 1). The dark blue zones mark international waters, in which further 
restrictions only exist with respect to their economic exploitation. Unexpectedly, the dark 
blue zones make no further distinction between contiguous zones and EEZ, and Ukraine 
did not insert border lines between alleged Ukrainian and Russian waters. 
 
Figure 8. Ukraine’s idea of the Sea of Azov.182 
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If such a partition of the Sea of Azov became sustainable, i.e., legal documents 
fixing that status, both states respecting it, and third countries acknowledging it (for 
example, by Freedom-of-Navigation operations), the Kerch Strait would implicitly alter its 
status, too. It would become a strait that is “used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone.”183 Access for third countries’ government-flagged ships would 
no longer depend on the consent from Russia and Ukraine. The situation would be 
comparable to international straits such as the Dover-Calais Strait or the Oresund. 
Independent of its requests and the legal reality fixed with the Cooperation 
Agreement, Ukraine already has unhindered access to the Sea of Azov. To reinforce this 
right, it twice sent naval vessels from its Black Sea port Odessa to Berdyansk, in September 
2018 and in November 2018. 
It is not clear why, notwithstanding the claims for which it filed the Arbitration 
Proceeding in September 2016, Ukraine submitted the State Border Treaty to the UN for 
recognition a mere two months later,184 the treaty which declared the disputed waters to 
be internal. Further, Ukraine’s former president Poroshenko publicly defended the position 
of the common internal water.185 
2. Russia’s Stance 
Russia wants to maintain the status of shared internal waters for the Sea of Azov 
but without conceding equal rights to Ukraine. Nossova calls this “the doctrine of state 
sovereignty.”186 She quotes Alexei Moiseev, a professor of Moscow’s Diplomatic 
Academy, “according to whom it [the doctrine of state sovereignty] is an ‘inalienable 
juridical quality of an independent state that symbolizes its political-legal self-sufficiency, 
supreme responsibility and value as a primary subject of international law; necessary for 
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exclusive leadership of the state power and assuming insubordination to the authority of 
another state.’ ”187 
Therefore, Russia has adopted two apparently contradictory approaches. First, its 
main legal argument is the historic approach, contending that the Sea of Azov and the 
Kerch Strait were internal water during the times of the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union. In the wake of the U.S.S.R.’s dissolution, the principle “uti possidetis”188 was to 
be applied. Further, Russia maintains that the Sea of Azov was, is, and will be an internal 
water of Russia and Ukraine, because the bilateral treaties with Ukraine mentioned earlier 
are still in force. Russia’s enjoys two major benefits from this specific status, in 
combination with the lack of a fixed border. On the one hand, third states can only enter 
the Sea of Azov if both littoral states consent; on the other hand, Russia can approach the 
Ukrainian coast without previous announcement, as close as it wants and at any time.189 
Hence, it clearly benefits from Ukraine’s conflicting arguments. 
Second, Russia acts in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait as if the waters have 
been newly distributed after Crimea’s annexation by the Russian Federation. In other 
words, there are Ukrainian and Russian (including the Crimean) territorial waters as 
illustrated by Figure 9. As revealed in Chapter II, Russia set new rules for navigation in the 
Kerch Strait, justifying their necessity with security measures for the Crimean Bridge and 
difficult navigational conditions. Russia’s conduct during the Kerch Strait incident 
evidently reinforces that stance. Russia fended off an unlawful penetration of its national 
maritime space and treated Ukraine like any other third party. 
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Figure 9. Russian and Ukrainian claims before (top) and after (bottom) 
2014.190 
This approach seems to refute the repeated proclamation of internal waters shared 
with its Ukrainian neighbor. Interestingly, even in the PCA case, Russia provides pieces of 
evidence for both points of view. Most striking is a transcript of the Russian-Ukrainian 
Consultations on the UNCLOS in Minsk in August 2016 stating, “The sovereignty of the 
Russian Federation covers all its territory including the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. 
Consequently, in compliance with the norms of international law, the Russian Federation 
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as a coastal state has sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in respect of sea waters 
adjacent to its coast, including the sea waters adjacent to the Crimean Peninsula.”191 
By contrast, with Nossova’s notion of state sovereignty the two-pronged approach 
is complementary. She says, “Sovereignty is the quality of ‘absolute and perpetual’ Russian 
state power that is supreme in relation to all other types of power.”192 She then elucidates, 
Russia seems to struggle to retain its lapsed full sovereignty in the region of 
the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Denial of the Ukrainian arguments on 
the Soviet administrative border and continuous support for the modified 
median line for the delimitation of the Sea of Azov would grant Russia a 
portion of the resource-rich seabed that is currently claimed by Ukraine. If 
Ukraine is to explore and exploit the largest portion of the continental shelf 
of the Sea of Azov, it will become less dependent on Russian gas and may 
invite competitive foreign oil and gas companies to the area. Additionally, 
exploration and exploitation of new oil and gas reserves shall decrease the 
resource price on the world market. Consequently, if Russia manages to 
persuade Ukraine to apply the modified median line to the delimitation of 
the Azov Sea, it will be Ukraine who will lose its current sovereignty over 
the area and Russia who will get an additional trump in support of its 
territorial and economic sovereignty.193 
This is a powerful reasoning. Russia’s actual goal is just power politics disguised 
with the juridical mantle. Alternatively and less convincing, Skaridov suggests that the 
historic situation, to which the treaties concluded in 2003 refer, “cannot be interpreted as 
[a] legal definition.... This provision is more declarative than legal; otherwise, the Parties 
should have stated that they consider the Azov Sea waters to be internal waters within the 
meaning of international law or UNCLOS. That is why ‘internal’ may be explained as 
inland waters from a geographical, economical, historical or any other perspectives, but 
not legal.”194 
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In sum, Russia must maintain the status of internal waters to prevent foreign 
warships other than Ukrainian ones from entering the Sea of Azov. As explained in the 
previous section, a transformation of the Sea of Azov into international waters would 
automatically grant the right of transit passage through the Kerch Strait to all ships and 
aircraft. Further, Russia is eager to explore and exploit the riches of the Sea of Azov, if not 
for its own benefit, then at least to deprive Ukraine of them, a kind of economic warfare. 
Last, Russia would have less leverage to enforce the inspections of maritime traffic bound 
for Ukrainian ports. If it did so in international waters, other states would almost certainly 
consider sending their navies to guarantee open sea lines of communication. 
C. IMPACT OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE 
The construction of the Crimean Bridge has strengthened Russia’s position laid out 
in the lower half of Figure 9. As mentioned before, this assessment does not take into 
account whether the annexation of Crimea violates international law. This section provides 
two elucidations. 
1. Legal Considerations 
Despite the numerous international resolutions and protests by Ukraine, the bridge 
is becoming an acknowledged construction that is harder to oppose with each passing day. 
Indeed, international shipping companies did not cease to send their vessels into the Sea of 
Azov and thus complied with Russia’s rules. Simply declaring the unlawfulness of the 
construction does not make it disappear. This is as true for the Crimean Bridge as it is for 
the artificial islands that China built in the South China Sea. Second, there is hardly 
anything more “absolute and perpetual” than the erection of the longest bridge in Europe, 
with which Russia can foster its sovereignty, if not superiority. Third, whatever the ruling 
of the Arbitral Tribunal and even if Russia accepted one in favor of Ukraine, the bridge 
would not be made undone. Finally, with regard to the current relationship between the two 
countries, the idea of sharing the bridge with a border point in the middle of Kerch Strait—
comparable to the regime of the Oresund Bridge—is utopian. 
One gets the idea that the Crimean Bridge and the struggle over the Kerch Strait 
has become an infinite loop. Russia has reinforced its dominance over the waters with the 
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construction of the bridge, and the bridge contributes to the Russian claims over the waters. 
The legal dispute is not more than an alibi to demonstrate Russia’s alleged adherence to 
international law and treaties. The arguments provided in the replies to Ukraine’s memorial 
and written objections leave no doubt that Russia is trying to use the UNCLOS to secure 
its grip on the waters around Crimea.195 
The construction of the Crimean Bridge and its necessary protection imply a denial 
of Ukraine’s access to the Kerch Strait. As this cannot be legally justified, not even in the 
Russian interpretation of the law, Russia demands a preliminary notice of every Ukrainian 
government-flagged vessel passing through the strait. This explains the incident in 
November 2018, but it remains unclear why two months earlier, Russia did not intervene 
with force. Ukraine alleges it duped the Russian authorities in September,196 whereas 
Russia asserts that the Ukrainians abided by the rules Russia set for the entering the Sea of 
Azov in 2015, i.e., a previous notification of the Russian authorities.197 An independent 
observer writes that the Ukrainian ships were not armed in September, which is why 
Russia’s border guard confined themselves to close surveillance.198 Without further 
explanations, he also proposes, 
The Russian side apparently did not expect the Ukrainian Navy to send its ships 
through the strait in September. According to some reports, it was after that 
incident in September that Russian officials ordered local authorities to prevent 
Ukrainian military ships from passing through the strait in the future. Their passage 
without Russian authorization may have been viewed as an affront to Russian 
sovereignty claims over the Kerch Strait (and thereby indirectly a claim against 
Russian sovereignty over Crimea).199 
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For the November incident, Schatz and Koval find, “The Ukrainian ships had 
reportedly notified the Russian authorities of their intention to pass through Kerch Strait, 
but, according to Russia, not within a notification period prescribed by Russia. Ukraine 
maintains that the notification was consistent with previous practice and that the Kerch port 
authority did not reply.”200 For this incident, independent sources are lacking. Whatever 
the truth, it remains to be said that Russia’s violent conduct against the Ukrainian ships, 
their seizure, and the arrest of their crews is a violation of international law and norms. For 
the UNCLOS does not provide for any action against warships. In fact, article 32 reads, 
“nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships 
operated for non-commercial purposes.”201 Russia’s only recourse toward any Ukrainian 
sovereign ship would have been to “require it to leave the territorial sea immediately,” in 
accordance with article 30 of UNCLOS.202 
2. The (Naval) Warfare Approach 
It is possible to consider the construction of the Crimean Bridge as an act of war, 
which logically entails a defense with military measures. Indeed, the construction of a 
bridge across the Kerch Strait has its historic precedent in World War II (see Chapter I). In 
contrast to today, however, the German Reich occupied the territories on both sides of the 
Kerch Strait, so the comparison lacks a basis. This also applies to the withdrawal of the 
Wehrmacht from the Red Army, for it left both Crimea and the Kuban peninsula. 
As laid out in Chapter I, the Russian narrative completely rejects the idea of 
occupation or international armed conflict (IAC) as far as Crimea is concerned. Since the 
fighting in Eastern Ukraine has not ceased, however, the conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine is not a frozen one either. Furthermore, according to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
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and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”203 Consequently, not 
only is the evidence undeniable, but Russia’s assessment is also irrelevant. 
Nothing in international law prohibits the construction of buildings or infrastructure 
unless the construction is considered as a “means of warfare which [is] intended, or may 
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural 
environment.”204 From the legal perspective, there is hence no reason to condemn Russia. 
If the Crimean Bridge is seen as a necessary means of supplying troops and ensuring their 
mobility, it is nothing more than an albeit costly necessity for the Russian war against 
Ukraine. With the construction of the bridge, Russia has closed a gap in its logistical chain 
and fortified its defense line of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. 
Understandably, Russia protects its strategically important construction with 
military means and resorts to violence if necessary, and this case materialized in November 
2018 from Russia’s point of view. “Because of the existence of an IAC, ... Russia’s conduct 
is not a violation of UNCLOS, as the law of the sea is displaced by the law of naval 
warfare,” writes Kraska.205 He further elaborates, “As an occupying power, Russia has the 
right (and indeed the obligation) to assure public safety and order in the occupied territory 
in accordance with articles 27 and 64 of GC IV [Geneva Convention IV].”206 This means 
that the Crimean Bridge necessitates measures to protect others from the hazards it might 
evoke, for instance, rules for navigating beneath it, including compulsory pilotage of 
Ukrainian vessels. In addition, the law of war also overrules bilateral contracts such as the 
Cooperation Agreement of 2003.207 Therefore, Ukraine can no longer refer to it, at least 
not in the (occupied) Kerch Strait. 
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In sum, Kraska is right in highlighting “how adept Russia is at exploiting the seam 
between the contending peacetime and wartime legal dimensions of the Crimea conflict to 
create perceptions of a ‘gray zone’ that effectively advance its geopolitical agenda.”208 On 
the other hand, there is little evidence that supports Kraska’s argument that Russia 
deliberately conducts naval warfare in the Kerch Strait. Despite the Russian naval ships 
patrolling the Sea of Azov occasionally, it is the units of the Coast Guard under the FSB 
that control the merchant ships and that brought up the Ukrainian ships.  
D. CONCLUSION 
With the construction of the Crimean Bridge, Russia has created a precedent that 
allows it to swiftly shift between its legal arguments for one single goal: the expansion and 
the reinforcement of its political power. Moreover, the bridge contributes to Russia’s state 
sovereignty. But, all this is just additional benefit. There is no reason to consider the legal 
aspect at the origin of the construction of the bridge, and Russia presumably would have 
had to face Ukraine before the PCA without building the bridge. 
The UNCLOS enacts this principle in the provisions regarding territorial waters.209 
Therefore, and to avoid further international isolation, Russia plays to the rules in the trial, 
even if it provides flexible interpretations of applicable law. Yet, crucial for the ruling 
within the domain of maritime law, it seems, is the consideration of the legal status of 
Crimea, deliberately omitted here because it is currently unresolvable and not in the 
competence of the court. Furthermore, the lack of maritime delimitations both in the past 
and today may hamper a definite decision, especially since the UNCLOS does not provide 
for delimitations of internal waters. An agreement on maritime borders in the Sea of Azov 
would have to be bilateral and then submitted to the UN for international recognition. It 
can be assumed that Russia would use its position reinforced by the presence of the 
Crimean Bridge to conclude a contract that puts its actual power into legal terms. 
Therefore, and based on the current relationship of the two states, the idea of a new 
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agreement is out of reach in the near future. What remains is the law of the strongest instead 
of the rule of law. 
In Chapter I, I referred to the Arctic Sea as a potential zone of conflict in the future 
because the littoral countries expect to exploit the rich natural resources there even into the 
twenty-first century as a result of climate change. As one of the arctic states, Russia has a 
clear interest to also support its claims by means of maritime law. Here, the first step in its 
territorial expansion was the filing of a submission with the Commission on the Limits of 
Continental Shelf, in which Russia requested parts of the Arctic Ocean.210 In 2007, it 
planted a Russian flag on the underwater Lomonosov ridge to reinforce its declaration.211 
Similar to the construction of the Crimean Bridge, Russia obviously created precedents and 
left the international community to respond to it. Even if an about-face is never excluded, 
its probability decreases with every year that passes. Therefore, the international 
community must react faster and more decisively to Russia’s forays. While it is too late to 
reverse the Crimean Bridge and Russia’s appropriation of Crimea, this should be a lesson 
for any future dispute. 
The development in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov should be watched closely 
by those countries and security alliances that want to support Ukraine in naval affairs in 
the future. For instance, in case NATO intensifies its cooperation with Ukraine and wants 
to show its support by making a courtesy call with navy ships to Berdyansk, Ukraine’s 
newly developed naval port in the Sea of Azov, it can only do so if invited by Ukraine and 
if granted by Russia. Nevertheless, there is no obvious reason why Russia should approve 
NATO units so close to its borders. Hence, it is unrealistic that Russia will subscribe to an 
idea invoked by Skaridov, who favors a transit regime for the Kerch Strait for the sake of 
maritime traffic, even if the Sea of Azov remains an internal water.212 
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It will be interesting to see what Russia will do if the bridge collapses one day, be 
it from an attack or from environmental conditions such as tectonic activity or heavy ice 
drift, which critics have invoked from the beginning. As the bridge supports its standpoint, 
Russia would be incentivized to re-erect it. The voluntary removal of the bridge is currently 
out of question, and it will almost certainly never be worth a consideration. Yet, Ukraine 
is not completely empty-handed. Kuczyński found, “After Russia detained Ukrainian 
vessels in the Kerch Strait, the Commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine Admiral Ihor 
Voronchenko announced Ukraine’s intention to close the Turkish straits for Russian 
warships. He invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention, which acknowledges such a 
possibility based on paragraph 20 of the document. Nonetheless, Ankara has not officially 
responded to such claims.”213 That could have been interesting, since dominating the Sea 
of Azov and the Kerch Strait has little or no use if the way to the world oceans is blocked 
afterwards. 
Both in times of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Russia dominated the 
water masses around its shores, and once again, its “current state practice in the realm of 
the law of the sea can be seen as relatively ‘imperialistic,’ striving for continuous dominion 
over the adjacent water spaces and support of Russian ‘Great Power’ position.”214 Indeed, 
Russia’s legal advances appear only as a means for another goal: the appeasement of the 
Russian soul. “In 1550, the Russian State and people were about to create an empire. Four 
and a half centuries later, at the end of the millennium, they are having to come to terms 
with suddenly no longer being an empire and having to be a nation.”215 Thus, the 
construction of the Crimean Bridge is a symbol of Russia’s new greatness, a means to 
recoup national strength and international esteem, as outlined in the next chapter. 
Admittedly, the Crimean Bridge supports Russia’s legal approach in the Sea of Azov, but 
it is not sufficient for the big investment. 
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IV. A SYMBOL OF RUSSIA’S POWER AND GREATNESS 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian people have been torn 
between the memory of glorious but past times and the prospect of a better future, 
essentially in terms of a higher living standard. The 1990s turned out to be a period of 
turbo-capitalism on the one hand and a gradually impoverished people and rotting state on 
the other hand. Russia’s default in 1998 and the impression then President Yeltsin 
conveyed during his appearances both in public and on television left many Russians with 
a feeling of humiliation and hopelessness. 
In this chapter, I argue that, in addition to its strategic and legal significance, the 
Crimean Bridge is a symbol for the Russian people, a balm for its stricken soul. It stands 
for Russia’s new glory, in particular, since it connects the Russian mainland to Crimea, the 
cradle of Russian identity. Admittedly, the modernization, renewal, and extension of 
Russia’s infrastructure do have a pragmatic aspect. Nevertheless, 
architecture ... [also] is a powerful and extraordinarily revealing expression 
of human psychology. It has a significance both at the largest scale and at 
the most personal. It is a means for inflating the individual ego to the scale 
of a landscape, a city, or even a nation. It also reflects the ambitions and 
insecurities and motivations of those who build; because of that, it offers a 
faithful reflection of the nature of power, its strategies, its consolations, and 
its impact on those who wield it.216 
Indeed, Crimean interviewees in a French-German documentary emphasize the beauty of 
the bridge and the pride they feel because of the bridge.217 For them, the bridge is a symbol 
of the greatness of Crimea, of Russia, and of President Putin. Even interviewed citizens in 
Mariupol, Ukraine, acknowledge that the bridge is a great work because it brings people 
together and that it should have been built long ago. Moreover, the Crimean Bridge is yet 
another structure erected for Putin to emphasize his achievements. It is more than a symbol 
of Russia’s ascent (or rather return) during his reign; it is a monument for him. His 
 
216 Deyan Sudjic, The Edifice Complex: How the Rich and Powerful Shape the World (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2005), 377. 
217 “Russland: Die neue Brücke zur Krim” [Russia: The New Bridge to Crimea], my own translation, 
July 22, 2019, ARTE, video, 24:43, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=muTMvWObD_E. 
68 
popularity and his approval ratings are far beyond what Western politicians can ever 
expect.218 The Russians are grateful to Putin. 
In the following discussion, I first call to mind the stabs the Russian people have 
had to endure since 1991 (and still deal with), which Putin has gradually cured and which 
must be understood to grasp the symbolic value of the Crimean Bridge, this striking 
landmark at a place steeped in history. Second, I give a brief summary of Putin’s 
personality and his apparent intentions. Third, I retrace the significance of building as a 
political act, before exemplifying it by the Kremlin’s efforts under Putin and with the 
Crimean Bridge as the major accomplishment. Ultimately, I conclude that the Crimean 
Bridge is not the work of a narcissistic and self-aggrandizing new tsar. Instead, it satisfies 
a general public interest, not just a pragmatic one, but also and especially an emotional one. 
It stands for Putin’s achievements, which cannot be illustrated with an equestrian statue. 
Since I refer to the notion of empire, I have to mention that this term is contentious. 
For Astrid Tuminez, the essential attribute of an empire is the ability of its center to exert 
control over its periphery even if their legal status is the same.219 She then declares three 
features as fundamental for the maintenance of an empire: “an effective center-periphery 
compact, consensus at the center regarding imperial rule and arrangements, and rulers’ will 
and competence to use force.”220 Notwithstanding the fact that the Russia is a semi-
presidential republic according to its constitution, Tuminez’s definition of an empire still 
fits contemporary Russia. Yet, other scholars have chosen to characterize today’s Russia 
as “transimperial” (Wallander), “post-imperial” (Trenin), or “neo-imperial” (van 
Herpen).221 
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Bobo Lo has a different approach and speaks of a “postmodern successor [to the 
traditional empire]. This type is tailored to a post-imperial era in international politics 
characterized by indirect control rather than direct rule and prefers to employ economic 
and cultural means instead of blunter military or political instruments.”222 Lo contends 
that such an approach corresponds to the Russian thinking. While Russia’s elite is mostly 
aware that the Soviet Union belongs to the past, “the idea of empire remains very much 
alive.”223 Walter Laqueur comes to a similar conclusion. He asks, “If the United Kingdom 
and France had accepted the loss of empire, why couldn’t Russia? Perhaps because of 
Russia’s conviction that it could not survive except as a great power.”224 Indeed, Dmitry 
Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO in 2009, claimed, “Russia considers itself a great 
power.”225 
A. THE GEOPOLITICAL DISASTER 
The “geopolitical disaster” is a phrasing Putin used himself in his 2005 Address to 
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.226 In that speech, Putin first deplored the 
depreciation of savings and the destruction of ideals, things with which ordinary people 
identify. Only then, he lamented the neglected or disbanded political institutions and the 
threatened domestic security. He denounced the exploitation of the country by self-
interested oligarchs which, accompanied by a massive recession, resulted in mass poverty 
and a paralyzed society.227 True, Russians simultaneously lost political stability, their 
economic system, and their ideological conviction. Yet, as Claus Offe already pointed out 
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in 1991, all post-communist countries in Eastern Europe would have to face this “triple 
transition.”228 
While some of these countries, for instance the Baltic states, quickly developed into 
democracies and integrated into Western Europe, “the rest failed, suffering massive 
damage to their economies and to their pride. Russia’s revisionist hostility is a reaction to 
this internal crisis, a time of troubles, expressed in a time-honored tradition of imperial 
aggression,” writes Mitchell Orenstein.229 Daniel Fata also asserts, “The Russian 
Federation had been devastated and humiliated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
loss of the Russian empire. The goal was to restore Russia’s national pride and make sure 
its influence was felt in the world.... It became clear that the United States may have 
underestimated the degree of humiliation experienced by Russia.”230 Nearly a decade later, 
it is right to add that the United States was not the only one to be mistaken. 
Russia was not the first empire to collapse in history, nor was it the first in the 
twentieth century. Laqueur elucidates why Russia is distinct from other empires: 
Most countries, even most great powers, are able to exist without a doctrine 
and a mission or manifest destiny, but not Russia. Its doctrine or ideology 
has several components: religion, ... patriotism/nationalism, ... geopolitics 
Russian style, Eurasianism, the besieged-fortress feeling, and zapadophobia 
(fear of the West).... The belief in Russia’s uniqueness goes back virtually 
to its beginnings; ...”Rus” was unique, without parallel.... Further, this 
conviction was usually paired with another belief—the suspicion of 
Russophobia, the certainty that all foreigners were against Russia.231 
It must be emphasized that this perception does not need to be founded on facts. On the 
contrary, ideas and beliefs often outlive facts. Laqueur concedes that many other countries, 
mainly in the nineteenth century were convinced of their special mission, but Russia stuck 
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to it. He concludes, “It should not therefore have come as a surprise that political 
messianism had a secular rebirth during the Soviet period and that it resurfaced in our time 
as part of the search for a new Russian idea.”232 
That said, Laqueur introduces the pivotal element of Russia’s collective 
conscience: the political elite determines the people’s perception. Truth, ideas, and 
convictions are generated by the Kremlin. Therefore, Galeotti rightly accuses Putin of 
“cherry-pick [ing] the bits of history that fit his narrative of a Russia that has been 
perennially battered and belittled by foreigners, yet strong when it stands together.”233 The 
most striking example is the exaltation of the Great Patriotic War (as World War II is 
usually referred to in Russia). Shaun Walker assesses it as the only event in Russian history 
that had the necessary narrative power to generate a new sense of national pride.234 In fact, 
since 1999, steadily more than eighty percent of Russians surveyed have replied that the 
victory in the Great Patriotic War gives them most pride.235 
In the same period, when asked for reasons of shame and regret in Russian history 
of the twentieth century, a majority always answered, “We’re a great people, a rich country 
always living in poverty and misery.”236 It is difficult to determine whether this sense of 
oppression and humiliation is a result of Russian politics or vice-versa. Nevertheless, in 
addition to the references in Chapter I, the following three events since 1991 have been 
used in Russia’s political rhetoric to highlight the degradation of the proud Russian people: 
The Kosovo War 
Russia considered the Balkans as part of its backyard and the Serbs as a brother 
people. Russia’s veto against a UN resolution was ignored by the West and NATO. When 
the international community established security sectors in Kosovo, Russia did not have 
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any under its control but had to submit its troops to NATO command. Putin justified the 
withdrawal of Russian troops in 2003 by saying “the presence of our military contingent, 
which does not decide anything and cannot influence anything, was pointless.”237 
Eastward Enlargement of NATO 
Not only have scholars disproven that the negotiations of Germany’s reunification 
included a promise that NATO would expand eastward,238 but also contemporary 
witnesses of the Two Plus Four Agreement like Mikhail Gorbachev have denied that 
tale.239 Still, Russian politics regularly repeats it. 
War on Terror / Afghanistan 
After 9/11, President Putin was the first foreign statesman to empathize with 
American President George W. Bush.240 The Kremlin’s expectation of a common fight 
against terrorism, however, was not honored. On the contrary, the United States and other 
Western countries established themselves in Central Asia, the next Russian backyard, 
without further consulting with Russia. 
The narrative of a stricken Russian soul and a humiliated people has developed well 
since 1991, and it continues to be fueled. In particular, President Putin has made use of that 
tool several times to justify his politics (see also the next section). On the occasion of 
Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, more than 22 years after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Putin said, “Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in 
different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the 
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Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to 
be divided by borders.”241 
It is obvious that a people cannot only mourn past times and glory. Therefore, as I 
am going to argue, Russian politics, and President Putin in particular, offered opportunities 
of consolation. Most known are the economic recovery in the wake of high oil prices in the 
mid-2000s and the re-unification with Crimea. But Putin is also a builder, and the Crimean 
Bridge is a genuine showpiece. The next section, though, first looks at President Putin 
himself. 
B. WHO IS PUTIN? 
There is no ultimate answer to that question, and a number of authors have come to 
different conclusions. Answers include Putin being an autocrat, a bureaucrat, a 
manipulator, a narcissist, an opportunist, and a patriot. Whatever characterization is most 
appropriate, Putin is not only aware of the humiliation and despair described previously, 
but is also affected by them. It is “his firm conviction that his personal destiny is 
intertwined with that of his country,” write Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy.242 This can be 
easily deducted from Putin’s own speeches at the Federal Assembly in 2005,243 at the 
Munich Security Conference in 2007,244 and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.245 
Moreover, essential is the Russian people’s perception of their president regardless of 
scholars’ or his own assessments. 
Steven Myers sees Putin as The New Tsar,246 an impression that former British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair supported in 2000. In his memoirs, Blair remembers his 
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reception by Putin at the Mariinsky Theater in Saint Petersburg: “I noticed people fell back 
as he approached, not in fear or anything; but a little in awe and with reverence. It was a 
tsar-like moment.”247 This is important insofar as it also highlights the public’s 
appreciation of the Russian president. Assuming Putin sees himself as a new tsar, the 
question that logically follows is which tsar is his role model. Peter the Great, who opened 
Russia toward the West and is considered as the father of the Russian state, is a likely 
answer, given that Putin has decorated his office with a portrait of this ruler.248 Yet, 
looking at the results of Putin’s twenty years in power, one tends to conclude that Putin 
mostly resembles Alexander III, who reversed the liberal reforms of his father and opposed 
any attempt to limit his own autocratic rule, but this does not imply that Putin seeks to be 
like Alexander III. 
Julia Ioffe reduces Putin to the KGB man and bureaucrat he was taught to be before 
ascending to the Kremlin. She highlights that Putin was trained in counter-intelligence, 
meaning that he is addicted to conspiracy theory and paranoia.249 In addition, Ioffe asserts, 
he is adept in manipulating people and winning them for his cause. While this 
characterization certainly contains some truth, one has to add two more aspects. First, 
winning others for one’s cause is an essential element of every (political) leader. In fact, 
even dictators need more than pure force to remain in power. Second, another quality of 
the people from the security services—probably in most countries—is their network of 
acquaintances and the fact that many of them keep contact to each other even after having 
left their service. Knowing and relying on the hierarchized entities like the state’s forces 
has been a logical consequence for Putin to control the hierarchical system he has created 
by his concentration of power. 
Ioffe also describes Putin as a narcissist because he is obsessed with his own 
appearance on television.250 Indeed, Putin had learned about the influential power of the 
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media when he became president. For former Russian business oligarch and government 
official Boris Berezovsky and his television station supported Putin’s electoral campaign 
to an extent that Putin sees himself as made by television and fears it as his nemesis.251 
Ioffe’s analysis finds unexpected support in the international tabloid press, which, during 
the last decade, has speculated on Putin using Botox or even plastic surgery to improve his 
appearance.252 
Mark Galeotti is convinced that “Putin has no ideological commitment to 
anything.”253 He assesses the Russian president to be an opportunist, albeit “a gut-level 
patriot who believes that Russia should be considered a great power ... because it’s 
Russia.”254 Both Galeotti and Marten point out that “Putin is a judoka, not a chess 
player,”255 with “judo [being] about immediate tactics, not long-term strategy.”256 
Though questionable if such a book would bear the same title twenty years later, 
the title of Putin’s self-portrait, published in 2000, is First Person257 (even in the Russian 
original). One gets the impression that Putin sees himself as a selfless man of action, e.g., 
when he claims to have been ready to risk his career for the sake of a Russian victory in 
Chechnya.258 Nonetheless, all his references to the war in Chechnya seem out of context 
when he alleges that tiny Chechnya threatened the existence of the entire Russian state. 
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Yet, it seems that Putin has taken Yeltsin’s plea “Take care of Russia” to heart, 
when the latter left the Kremlin.259 Shaun Walker underlines Putin’s patriotic self-
understanding when he writes, “Putin has made himself synonymous with the new state. 
By the end of his next presidential term [2024], he will have been in power for nearly a 
quarter of a century. ‘Without Putin there is no Russia,” said Vyacheslav Volodin, one of 
his top aides, a few years ago.’ ”260 Orenstein contends that Putin fused “Soviet pride and 
tsarist nationalism ... [and] even adopt [ed] the Soviet anthem as the new Russian anthem, 
but with new words.”261 He gives Putin credit for turning the bad feelings of the Russian 
people over the 1990s against the West and concludes, “It seems that, from the beginning 
of his rule, he sought to revive the Soviet system, using many old techniques, values, 
approaches, and even personnel, with some updates derived from Russia’s nationalist and 
tsarist legacy.”262 
Despite a number of protests in the 2010s, Putin remains a very popular president. 
Not only are his approval ratings impressive, the reasons voters give for their support of 
Putin are also interesting. About one-third characterizes him as “energetic, decisive, [and] 
strong-willed.”263 Galeotti opines, “Putin is to a large extent being rated not as a man, not 
even as a politician, but as an icon of Russia.”264 Moreover, Russia’s mostly state-owned 
media openly back a personality cult by showing Putin doing manly things, sometimes 
even shirtless, making him a living national hero in Russia.265 
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Putin has transformed Russia’s political system—now often referred to as 
Putinism266—to an extent that the president does not necessarily need to claim the things 
he desires.267 According to Galeotti, many parts of the Russian state and Russian society 
are interspersed with corruption, so that much is only possible by favors and access to 
people in power. Loyalty and favors are also the currency to pay back. Money itself is of 
lower importance: “The Kremlin doesn’t pay people—it simply grants opportunities that 
they can milk. In return, rather than handing over suitcases of cash, they invest in projects, 
donate to charities, grant stakes in businesses, and look after friends.”268 Galeotti, like 
Ledeneva, sees this system as a remnant of former, tsarist times. 
When it comes to building projects, the system of favors has its own significance. 
Allegedly, Putin’s summer palace at Cape Idokopas was financed in that way. “He [Putin] 
didn’t pay for it himself. He didn’t even do so out of the state budget, period; instead, he 
demanded that a number of the wealthiest businessmen make voluntary donations to fund 
healthcare improvement. It was a request you couldn’t refuse,” Galeotti argues.269 
Similarly, he elaborates, Putin’s childhood friends from Saint Petersburg, the brothers 
Rotenberg, first “fed” on the construction of the 2014 Winter Olympics site in Sochi and a 
Russian truck toll system, before showing their loyalty when it came to invest in and to 
redevelop the annexed Crimean peninsula.270 They did not flinch when they were put 
under international sanctions, and “they were rewarded for taking this hit; Arkady 
Rotenberg’s Stroygazmontazh corporation was awarded the contract worth nearly £3 
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billion [$3.7 billion] to build the 18-kilometre bridge connecting the peninsula to the 
Russian mainland. It is impossible to know for sure how far this is a result of favouritism, 
but that is certainly the assumption of many within Moscow.”271 
Though it is not easy to grasp Putin’s personality, in particular the significance of 
his self-esteem, scholars agree that Putin’s main goal is to make Russia great again. Putin’s 
recycling of the feeding system and his emphasis on loyalty make benefiters return favors 
by pleasing Putin and the country. For even if businesspeople like the Rotenbergs enrich 
themselves with tax money, the roads, rails, and bridges are built to the benefit of the 
Russian populace. This double incentive for building as a political process is the subject of 
the next section. 
C. ARCHITECTURE FOR THE PEOPLE 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, building is part of the political process 
through its demonstration of power. According to Johanna Tiedtke-Braschos, “political 
interests, ideologies, and system structures” are essential for the building in a state.272 She 
distinguishes two reasons why those in power have to engage themselves in building. First, 
it is their duty to care for and to promote general public interests because building has a 
tangible function, meaning that it addresses basic needs of the populace, such as protection 
against enemies or weather. Second, building has an intangible function “based on the 
symbolic character of the built environment as a communication medium. In addition to its 
practical value, this function conveys significance, values, and meanings (for example 
“home” and culture, wealth and power).”273 This second function also relates to the artistic 
aspect of architecture, to its beauty, but also to its potential to “shape the culture of 
remembrance as well as to ‘persuade of’ or even to compel political admiration and 
obedience.”274 
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For the deliberate use of the symbolic function of architecture by those in power, 
there are innumerable examples in history, supplemented by projects that were only 
planned but eventually not built. Most famous is certainly the city of Versailles, France, in 
which Louis XIV, the Sun King, demonstrated his power vis-à-vis the French nobility.275 
Deyan Sudjic also illustrates that such architectural achievements are not limited to 
autocrats when he reminds us of the “transformed Louvre and the Grande Arche at La 
Défense as an essential part of his [François Mitterand’s] strategy to make Paris the 
undisputed capital of a modern Europe.”276 
Among his unrealized projects, Hitler’s intended renewal of Berlin as Germania 
was to feature the monumental Ruhmeshalle (Hall of Glory), which was to have a height 
of 300 m and admit up to 180,000 people.277 According to Winfried Nerdinger, after the 
Nazis’ ultimate victory, delegations of the defeated peoples would be driven to the dome 
to give them a lasting impression of German superiority and thereby to prevent future 
revolts.278 
In Russia, one of the best examples for architectural expression of power is the city 
of Saint Petersburg. Peter the Great built this town, his new capital, from scratch not only 
as “a window to the West,” but also based on western townscapes for which he engaged 
Italian and French architects.279 The Winter Palace (begun under Peter the Great but in its 
present form commissioned under Empress Elizabeth) is a reflection of the tsars’, and thus 
Russia’s, might and power. 
Similar to Hitler’s building plans, Stalin initialized the construction of the Palace 
of the Soviets, an epic skyscraper, which would have been the tallest edifice of its time. 
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Tiedtke-Braschos calls the project “a vision of totalitarian representation of the people.”280 
She finds no other purpose in the palace than Stalin’s expression of his understanding of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
The significance of building as a decisive tool of politics is well illustrated by Karl 
Badberger, also quoted in Tiedtke-Braschos: “War is the continuation of politics by other 
means. The same can be said of building; those in charge of all times have recognized this 
and have used this effective instrument for their intentions.”281 
D. PUTIN THE BUILDER 
Putin has built his power upon his bureaucratic talent, his power instinct, his 
ruthlessness, and his way with the Russian people. But he was also lucky over long periods 
of time, for instance when he profited from high oil and gas prices, which allowed massive 
investments in the country and, thereby, a significant improvement of the Russians’ living 
standards. 
More is still to come. After his reelection in spring 2018, Putin signed a presidential 
decree to launch another infrastructure investment package, the projects of which “range 
from a massive road-, bridge-, and airport-building program, renewal of urban housing 
stock, and new gas and oil pipelines to big investments in the “Northern Passage” sea route 
between the Far East and Europe over the top of Russia, which climate change has made 
increasingly viable.”282 Although Fred Weir cites critics, who denounce a missing long-
term strategy, who speak of Soviet-like central planning with uncertain outcome, or who 
see it as insufficient in view of the investment backlog in Russia’s infrastructure, he also 
refers to opinion polls, which show wide popular support for this kind of investment. 
With this policy, Putin primarily addresses the general public need and uses the 
tangible function of building. Building bridges seems to have a special meaning to Putin. 
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In November 2019, he approved the construction of the bridge across the Lena River,283 
which he had postponed in the past to free money for the Crimean Bridge (see Chapter II). 
According to Mia Bennett, 
Putin is no stranger to building bridges. The Russian leader has built 16 of 
Russia’s 25 longest bridges, a record that has probably now [with the 
opening of the Crimean Bridge] increased to 17 out of 25. Previously, 
perhaps his most noteworthy accomplishment in bridge-building was the 
rapid construction of three bridges in the subarctic city of Vladivostok, on 
the country’s Pacific coast, in advance of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Summit in 2012. Those bridges, two of which were incredibly 
long cable-stayed structures, had major geopolitical cachet because they 
demonstrated to visiting dignitaries from Asia that Russia was serious about 
its “Pivot to the East.”284 
Interestingly, four of these long bridges are in Saint Petersburg, Putin’s hometown; in terms 
of aesthetics, they occupy the top of the list.285 Yet, the Crimean Bridge remains the most 
impressive, simply because of its sheer size. 
In contrast to the bridges in Siberia and Saint Petersburg, the functional value of 
the Crimean Bridge is contentious, as noted in Chapter II. Blinkin, the transportation and 
road construction expert, argues that a bridge would be imperative if Crimea had an 
extracting industry, but since “ ’Crimea is a tourism region, ... this project is purely 
political—it aims to mark the territory.’ ”286 Alexey Starodubov, the director of the 
Crimean Expert Center in Ukraine, agrees: “ ’They [Russia] had to show to the world that 
they could construct such a project. It’s just an explanation that they have close ties with 
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Crimea, so this is some kind of communication line between the rest of Russia and the 
occupied peninsula.’ ”287 He doubts any economy benefit for the peninsula. 
On the contrary, the symbolic function is both promoted and present in the 
population. According to Litvinova, an advertising video clip for the Crimean Bridge 
matched its construction with the building of the Baikalo-Amur Siberian Mainline, a 
colossal railway project of the 1970s, traversing Eastern Siberia parallel to the Trans-
Siberian railway. “Comparisons with the grandeur of the Baikalo-Amur Mainline ... are in 
line with how President Vladimir Putin sees the new Kerch bridge—something to land him 
in history textbooks,” she says.288 During the inauguration ceremony of the bridge, 
President Putin declared, “This is a historic day, because people have been dreaming of 
building exactly this bridge since the Tsarist Empire.”289 In addition, as if he wanted to 
confirm Starodubov, Kayran Tursunbekov, the assistant manager of the bridge construction 
site, proclaims that the bridge also serves as a business card of the know-how of today’s 
Russian engineering power.290 
Several elements of the bridge construction are indeed staggering: first, the ease 
with which the enormous costs were shouldered. Second, many experts have warned 
against the construction of the bridge at this location because the region is seismically 
active, and engineers remain doubtful if the employed techniques will prevent the collapse 
of the bridge.291 Finally, the duration of the building process was only three years if the 
preliminary works are included. 
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Nevertheless, the most important feature of the bridge’s symbolic function is that, 
day by day, it displays the Russian victory over Ukraine. The bridge demonstrates who is 
in charge in Crimea, in the Kerch Strait, and in the wider Black Sea area. Even though, de 
jure, the bridge violates Ukraine’s sovereignty, Russia just built it, a continuous 
provocation of Ukraine. Moreover, what could not be achieved together has become reality 
when Russia took care of it alone, a construction of the century, maybe the Russian 
construction of the twenty-first century. Even more, what Ukraine could not provide, 
Russia does now; as one interviewee in the ARTE documentary states, Russia is building 
up Crimea whereas under Ukraine’s rule, there was an “absolute standstill.”292 
But not only does the bridge stand for Russia. As noted earlier, people link the 
bridge to the Russian president, and it was not for nothing that he opened the bridge sitting 
at the steering wheel of a truck, being the first to cross the bridge. He achieved what has 
not been accomplished over centuries. The Crimean Bridge was to be built, and the 
“energetic, decisive, [and] strong-willed”293 president did it. Taking up the words of 
Litvinova and seizing on Ioffe’s description of Putin as a narcissist, one can conclude that 
Putin, with the Crimean Bridge illustrates Sudjic’s insight: “Building is the means by which 
the egotism of the individual is expressed in its most naked form.”294 
E. CONCLUSION 
Building is part of the political process and can both address general public interests 
and satisfy the political leaders’ need for admiration. As seen in Chapter II, the Crimean 
Bridge has value for the Crimean populace and the Russian state and its armed forces. It is 
therefore in contrast to monuments that past and present dictators have planned or erected 
for themselves and their rule. Further, as it remains unclear whether and to what extent the 
Russian state financed this project or if the bridge is result of favoritism, one cannot say 
with certainty that Putin has erected a monument in his honor. One thing remains definite, 
however, as boiled down by Harald Martenstein: “Only autocrats can realize great 
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architectural visions, be it St. Peter’s Basilica, the pyramids or, today, the city of 
Dubai.”295 
Yet, people will always connect the bridge to Putin. For, he has made possible a 
symbol of Russia’s greatness, built on shaky ground where many engineers failed before, 
the longest bridge in Europe, a bridge to the lost part of the Russian people, to the cradle 
of Russia, against all odds, by Russian engineers with Russian money, in record time, like 
a resurrection from the ashes of the Russian people. Putin thereby earned the people’s 
gratitude, in particular that of the Crimean populace. Should he ever have to withdraw from 
Crimea, he may burn his bridges behind him, but not the Crimean Bridge. 
 




V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, I have analyzed the utility and the significance of the Crimean Bridge, 
focusing on Russia. For the bridge is not somewhere in the vastness of the country. It spans 
the Kerch Strait, a maritime strait of geostrategic importance, not only for Russia. I have 
found that the bridge can indeed be seen as a kind of hybrid warfare, strengthening Russia’s 
strategic position in and around the Sea of Azov, mainly in Crimea. Although the analysis 
of the legal hypothesis could not lead to the conclusion that the construction of the bridge 
is rooted in considerations of international law, it has shed a light on how Russia conceives 
of international law and international treaties. In fact, Russia only adheres to those 
agreements (or sometimes only parts of them) from which the country benefits. After all, 
the Crimean Bridge is an important symbol, not only for the Russian people but also for 
Ukraine and the rest of the world because it shows of what Russia is (again) capable. 
Throughout my research, I found most literature on the choke point between Crimea 
and the Russian mainland deals with the strategic advantage that derives from the bridge. 
The economic impact on Ukraine is already receiving less attention, at least in the English-
speaking world. The few Ukrainian sources I was capable of consulting pointed in a 
different direction, but since I am not literate in Ukrainian and Russian, I am unable to 
make a final statement on this. The legal aspect is currently covered by only a small number 
of experts. As the trial before the PCA progresses, I expect further analyses. Nevertheless, 
I think that only the final decision of the court and the reactions of Ukraine and Russia will 
give rise to substantial discussions. Although I was aware of Russia’s massive 
infrastructure investments in the course of high oil prices in the 2000s, I was surprised to 
discover that Putin is indeed a “bridge-builder.” The symbolic value of Putin’s building 
accomplishments, in relation to Tiedtke-Braschos’s understanding of building as a political 
matter, can and should receive further research. A focus on the developments in Putin’s 
hometown of Saint Petersburg would offer an interesting starting point because it obviously 
benefited more than most from the investments.296 
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In this concluding chapter, I summarize my findings and point to general policy 
implications. Countries that either work closely with Ukraine or have an overall interest in 
the wider Black Sea area may infer further steps to mitigate Russia’s dominance and ensure 
stability in that part of the world. 
A. RUSSIA’S REINFORCED STRATEGIC POSITION 
In Chapter II, I validated my hypothesis that the Crimean Bridge can be seen as 
evidence of a hybrid or gray-zone approach in the Kremlin’s plan to secure Crimea and the 
entire Russian Black Sea coast, although I pointed out that the notion of both hybrid and 
gray zone approaches is contentious among scholars. The particularity of these approaches, 
i.e., that the level of action remains below the threshold of open conflict, is clearly fulfilled 
with the construction of the Crimean Bridge. Yet, the impact of the bridge is such that 
Russia’s overall situation in and around the Sea of Azov has improved without the state 
having to resort to aggressive military action. In addition to the eased access to Crimea, 
Russia has achieved exclusive control over both the Kerch Strait and most of the Sea of 
Azov. With the construction of the Crimean Bridge, Russia consolidated its southern 
defense line and ensured that the access to the Sea of Azov de facto remains under Russian 
control regardless of legal constraints. 
With the Crimean Bridge, Russia further reinforced its Crimean stronghold. This 
does not imply any use of the peninsula as a forward base to launch an attack on the 
Ukrainian mainland, however. Although the idea or the fear that Russia might establish a 
land bridge between Crimea and Eastern Ukraine is still around, there is little incentive for 
Russia to do so. What would be Russia’s benefit from conquering further parts of Ukraine? 
Russia already secured its access to the Black Sea and denied NATO, its main adversary, 
access to Crimea. Any further occupation of Ukraine would entail the need for control and 
supply of these zones, which would be costly and tantamount to even more Russian troops. 
Without popular support like it has in Eastern Ukraine, Russia might encounter a situation 
much worse than the stalemate in the Donbass. 
Moreover, the Crimean Bridge supports Russia’s efforts to maintain economic 
pressure on Ukraine. The Kerch Strait has always been a strategic choke point and is now 
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a bottleneck for maritime commercial traffic as well. Because Russia itself relies on its 
ports along the Azov coast, its preferred clearance of maritime traffic from and to Russian 
ports erodes the already tense situation for Ukrainian ports. 
B. THE LEGAL PRECEDENT 
I concluded in Chapter III that the legal considerations could not have been the 
origin of the construction of the Crimean Bridge. Furthermore, the bridge itself cannot 
contribute to any establishment or alteration of the maritime borders between Russia and 
Ukraine because such a delimitation is inextricably linked to the status of the landmasses. 
The Law of the Sea follows territorial law, and as long as Russia controls Crimea, its 
maritime claims may be derived from that fact. Since, from the Russian perspective, 
Crimea is part of the Russian Federation, the waters around the peninsula are consequently 
Russian territorial waters. I speculated that Russia might use the presence of the Crimean 
Bridge to conclude a contract which puts its actual power into legal terms.  
Yet, the bridge supports Russia’s legal claims by the backdoor of customary law. I 
showed that international maritime traffic continued to pass through the Kerch Strait, 
obedient to the rules Russia established. Furthermore, international protests against 
Russia’s conduct in the Kerch Strait only arose with the capture of three Ukrainian vessels 
in November 2018, but ebbed shortly afterwards and ceased entirely when the ships were 
returned to Ukraine a year later. (The crew had already returned to Ukraine in September 
2019 during an exchange of prisoners.) 
Ultimately, Russia’s legal power game, in which the Crimean Bridge has become 
a trump card, reveals its general stance on international law and international treaties and 
is therefore a prelude to its political power struggle. The importance does not arise from 
Russia’s disregard for international contracts. It is much more the reaction of the 
international community in which Russia is interested. Hence, the UNCLOS is a 
formidable test case because many nations ratified it, and it even includes rules on the 
abatement of differences. I offered the prospect of the Arctic Sea as a potential zone of 
contention in the near future, where a one-sided change of the rules of the game may start 
with the erection of infrastructure similar to the Crimean Bridge.  
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C. THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE 
In addition to its strategic value, the Crimean Bridge can be seen as a symbol of 
resurrected Russian pride, a remedy for a number of humiliations that the Russian people 
had to endure since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I showed that the bridge fulfills 
both the tangible and the intangible functions as defined by Tiedtke-Braschos. For it has 
both the functional advantages of a normal bridge and the strategic benefits as outlined in 
Chapter II and a symbolic function in that it conveys significance, values, and meanings. 
Russians admire the aesthetics of the bridge and are proud of its accomplishment. As 
mentioned, even some Ukrainians in Mariupol acknowledge the bridge as a point of pride. 
In sum, in today’s great power competition, a contest in which the notion of unfair 
treatment seems to be of high importance, Russia succeeded in regaining strength at least 
domestically with the erection of the Crimean Bridge. I did not investigate the external 
perception of the Crimean Bridge, but I would not be surprised if a survey led to an overall 
positive attitude toward the bridge, ignoring the political consequences for Ukraine. This 
could be part of further research as indicated at the beginning of this chapter. 
I also concluded that the bridge might be considered as a monument for President 
Putin because he is the one who made this bridge possible. Not because he built it himself, 
but because he created the political conditions necessary for its construction; under his rule, 
Russia regained both economic and political strength. Ultimately, he is the one who will 
remain in the people’s memory for having brought Crimea back into the Russian 
Federation. 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It is pointless to discuss what could have been done by the international community 
when Russia started to build the Crimean Bridge. Two questions are of importance: what 
should the international community do now, and what can be done to prevent similar 
circumstances in the future? To my mind, the Crimean Bridge as a bridge does not offer 
any guidance. The circumstances which led to and allowed for its construction, however, 
need to be looked at. 
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One gets the impression that Russia is testing how far it can go, especially because 
it often announced in advance what steps it would take in response to the enlargement of 
NATO and the EU.297 The seizure of Crimea was one of those announced intentions. The 
EU and several other states implemented economic sanctions on Russia both in response 
to the annexation of Crimea and after the Kerch Strait incident. In Chapter II, I referred to 
Ashford,298 who convincingly points out that the Russian state is able and willing to 
mitigate sanctions, at least the current ones, against some of its businesspeople. 
Admittedly, sanctions can still become tougher, but this would also entail economic 
downturns for the senders, for which I do not see public support. Moreover, trying to tame 
Russia with international law and treaties has turned out to be equally futile. That merely 
leaves two other options: hard power or relenting. In the following sections, I argue for 
maintaining the bridge, giving in to some of Russia’s demands, and preparing for action 
that is more decisive. 
1. Weighing the Potential Consequences 
In the eyes of realists (in terms of political science), hard or military power goes 
hand in hand with sanctions. In his analysis of the years 1919–1939, E.H. Carr highlighted, 
“the bitter lesson of 1935–36 was needed to drive home the truth that in sanctions, as in 
war, the only motto is ‘all or nothing,’ and that economic power is impotent if the military 
weapon is not held in readiness to support it. Power is indivisible; and the military and 
economic weapons are merely different instruments of power.”299 In other words, if 
sanctions do not lead to the desired effect, military power has to follow. Yet, none of the 
sanctions against Russia within the last years has been followed up by military means, 
 
297 See, for example, Stephen Blank, “Russia Versus NATO in the CIS,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, May 14, 2008, https://www.rferl.org/a/1117479.html; Vladimir Socor, “Moscow Makes Furious but 
Empty Threats to Georgia and Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 5, no. 70 (April 14, 2008), 
https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-makes-furious-but-empty-threats-to-georgia-and-ukraine/. 
298 See footnote 119. 
299 E. H. Carr, “Realism and Idealism,” extract from The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, Second 
edition (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1960) in Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on 
Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts, Fifth edition (New York: Routledge, 2017), 95. 
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certainly for legitimate reasons, with appropriateness being the first coming to my mind, 
immediately followed by “what then?” 
Hard power could mean the destruction of the Crimean Bridge. That would be an 
act of aggression against a sovereign state; the perpetrator would have to expect a Russian 
retaliation; and a new spiral of violence would begin. Since Ukraine already pondered the 
destruction of the Crimean Bridge,300 supporting Ukraine in so doing would be an option 
with limited political collateral damage. Additionally, the destruction of the Crimean 
Bridge would be a stab in the heart of Russia due to the symbolic value of the bridge as 
explained in Chapter IV. Demolishing this symbol of Russian pride might therefore lead 
to a much harsher Russian reaction than any other military strike, with the exception of a 
nuclear strike. On the other hand, Ukraine is also heavily dependent on unhindered passage 
through the Kerch Strait. The debris of a destroyed bridge would block maritime traffic for 
a considerable period. Consequently, this option is only fictive and has to be discarded. 
“Violating international law should have a cost,” wrote Ian Bond after the 
annexation of Crimea.301 This can be applied to Russia’s violation of maritime law in the 
Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov without further ado. Freedom-of-Navigation operations 
in the Sea of Azov appear as an option, especially because Ukraine argues for a delimitation 
of Russian and Ukrainian territorial waters that would allow for it. Yet, as Admiral Foggo 
III, commander of United States Naval Forces Europe – Naval Forces Africa, stated, “I 
would not expect us to go in there.”302 
As argued in Chapter III, since Ukraine has not yet abrogated its treaties with 
Russia, any intrusion of de jure Russian internal waters by a third party would put that state 
at the same level as Russia in terms of ignorance and violation of international law. It would 
remind Russia of the Kosovo war, which it considers to have been illegal because it lacked 
a resolution of the UN Security Council. The lack of such a resolution was, in fact, a direct 
 
300 See footnote 140. 
301 Ian Bond, “There Are Other Ways to Help Ukraine,” The New York Times, September 9, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/08/should-nato-be-helping-ukraine-face-russia/there-are-
other-ways-to-help-ukraine. 
302 Bodner and Larter, “The Sea of Azov Won’t Become the New South China Sea.” 
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result of Russia’s veto, and since Russia would veto any resolution against it, decisive 
action against Russia will remain without legitimation. In sum, the current portfolio of hard 
military, political, and legal measures available to the international community is very thin. 
2. Seeking Harmony with Russia 
Many states, in particular Russia’s immediate neighbors, have difficulty imagining 
that they can get along well with Russia again. How should they deal with Russia when it 
does not respect treaties? In a number of scenarios, ceding to Russia’s hegemonic behavior 
and its wish to re-establish its former spheres of influence would be tantamount to giving 
up the idea of a liberal and democratic order.303 The neutral countries between the West 
(NATO and EU countries) and Russia would be reduced to voiceless bargaining chips. 
Other approaches like the German one, i.e., continuing business with Russia by buying 
Russian oil and gas, have also provoked harsh echoes. Yet, Germany has successfully 
followed that strategy since the 1970s in the liberal conviction that trade prevents war. 
I have pointed out that many disputes with Russia are rooted in its perceived 
humiliation. Russia sees itself as a great power, wants to be respected as such, and wants 
to be fairly treated. (In that respect, by the way, it is not the only one.) In his speeches, 
Putin made clear what he sees as red lines for his country. Thus, states should consider 
respecting those Russian requests that do not oppose vital interests of the West. For 
example, Russia has rejected Ukraine’s admittance to NATO, which could have meant 
NATO troops in Crimea in the past and still could mean NATO warships in the Sea of 
Azov. Why Putin does not want such conditions is not of great importance to others and 
could be accepted. He may see the Sea of Azov as his backyard, which he must only share 
with Ukraine; so, why not respect that view? Notwithstanding any future agreement 
between Ukraine and Russia on the status of the Sea of Azov, a non-binding declaration 
(for example, by NATO) not to enter the Sea of Azov by warship would send a signal to 
Russia that its wish would be met. 
 
303 See for instance Michael E. O’Hanlon, Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern 
Europe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019); and to a lesser extent John J. Mearsheimer, 
“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 
93, no. 5 (October 2014). 
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Recognizing and consulting Russia in matters of international politics may also be 
advantageous when it comes to further confrontation with China. An alliance of Russia and 
China against the United States or the West would be a greater burden than to fawn over 
Russia from time to time. 
3. Being Rigorous 
Respecting Russia and its interests does not mean giving up a position of strength 
and submitting to Russia. I am convinced that Russia and Putin understand the language of 
power, but words must be followed by actions. Sanctions must inflict harm and if they are 
not fruitful, the international community must be prepared for resolute military action. The 
question of the willingness to defend the rule of law with the military and accepting 
economic hardship is then a domestic one in the first place. Second to that, it is a matter of 
unity among the international organizations and institutions. 
Nor does respect for Russia mean having to abandon a liberal and democratic 
stance. On the contrary, Russia will only be able to impose its will on buffer countries as 
long as they remain susceptible to autocratic rule. These countries, too, understand the 
language of power. If they want to get rid of Russian dominance and be members of NATO 
or the EU, they must follow a clear agenda of liberalization and democratization. For this, 
the international community can offer assistance. If a country like Ukraine does not want 
to be a voiceless buffer between two Russia and the West, it must decide where it stands 
and not where it can get more advantages. The submission of the State Border Treaty to 
the UN, which I highlighted in Chapter III, is only one example of such ambiguous conduct. 
Otherwise, the West should not shed tears and be happy that there is less of a problem 
between them and Russia. 
To be rigorous also means to be united before facing Russia, be it as an alliance, as 
a union, or as only a smaller group of states. The Ukraine crisis with all its facets revealed 
that NATO and the EU struggle to speak with one voice. In the Arctic, the group of 
concerned states is smaller, but since all littoral states of the Arctic Ocean other than Russia 
are members of NATO, unity and a common stance toward international law and 
international treaties, including but not limited to their ratification, are paramount. 
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